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American constitutional thought is controlled by certain paradigms that limit the 
ability to think beyond them. A careful reading of the Harvard Law Review 
Forewords—the “tribal campfire” of American constitutional thinkers—is one way to 
detect these paradigms. Based on reading these Forewords since their inception in 
1951 and until 2019, I track how the concept of judicial legitimacy has been 
understood over the years. My analysis shows that in recent decades an understanding 
of judicial legitimacy in terms of public support has risen to the status of a controlling 
paradigm. While this understanding is currently considered commonsensical, it stands 
in tension with an understanding of judicial legitimacy in terms of expertise that goes 
back to Alexander Hamilton and dominated the Forewords up until the 1960s. Rather 
than viewing the Supreme Court as requiring public support for its legitimacy, 
according to the Hamiltonian view, the Court requires “merely judgment.” Tracking 
the genealogy of judicial legitimacy in the Harvard Forewords also shows how the 
shift from Hamilton’s understanding of judicial legitimacy to the current 
understanding was connected to the invention of public opinion polling. This 
invention allowed for the first time in history to measure public support for the Court. 
Before this invention, with only elections as the accepted tool for measuring public 
support, understanding the Court’s legitimacy in terms of public support was 
impossible. With the rise of opinion polls as an authoritative democratic legitimator, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is hard for scholars to see beyond the horizons of the paradigms controlling their 
discipline, even when it comes to the authors of the Harvard Law Review Forewords 
(hereinafter Forewords). Disciplinary paradigms are akin to a lens through which 
members of a profession see reality.1 Because the Forewords reflect the current state 
of American constitutional thought,2 tracking a concept throughout the Forewords 
allows us to expose the paradigms controlling current American constitutional 
thinking.  
In this Article, I focus on one paradigm that received its most explicit statement in 
Pamela Karlan’s 2011 Foreword titled Democracy and Disdain.3 Karlan’s Foreword 
 
1 See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 36–37 (2d ed. 1970). This 
article follows Kuhn’s use of the term “paradigm” as “way of seeing” phenomena in a certain 
field. See Margaret Masterman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in 4 CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH 
OF KNOWLEDGE 59, 59–79 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970). 
2 See Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and 
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 463 (1994–95) (discussing the unique status of 
the Harvard Forewords and noting that “[w]ithin the community of scholars of constitutional 
law the ‘Forewords’ are widely taken to be good indications of the state of the field.”). 
3 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term – Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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is controlled by the idea that the Supreme Court requires enduring public support to 
function properly. While Karlan presents this idea as an uncontested truth of 
constitutional thought, I argue that it is merely a product of the current age in American 
constitutional thinking. In order to show that Karlan does not merely state a fact or an 
inherent principle of constitutional system, I expose the history of this idea as it is 
manifested in the Harvard Forewords. In earlier Forewords—as perhaps best 
exemplified by Owen Fiss’s 1978 Foreword—authors did not consider public support 
for the Court as a requirement for its proper function.4 By describing a period in which 
this paradigm did not control American constitutional theory, I dispel the claim that 
the connection between judicial legitimacy and public support is an inherent truth of 
constitutional thinking.5  
Furthermore, I show that this paradigm’s current hold over American 
constitutional thinking is a result of certain contingent historical conditions that only 
arose in recent decades. One central condition that enabled the rise of this new 
paradigm was the invention of public opinion polling and the measurement of support 
for the Court. Therefore, this paradigm is not an inherent truth that is derived 
analytically from constitutional “structure” or logic. Rather, it is a contingent 
understanding that stems from certain conditions that currently persist in the US.6  
The Article proceeds as follows: I begin with a brief discussion of the methodology 
used for demonstrating that a conceptual change has occurred. Next, I juxtapose 
Karlan’s view that the Court’s source of legitimacy is public support with Alexander 
Hamilton’s view that the Court’s source of legitimacy is expertise. Based on the 
preparatory work done in these two sections, I am able in the following section to 
identify a shift in the understanding of judicial legitimacy in the Forewords. In this 
section, I conduct a genealogical journey through the pages of all the Forewords 
published in Harvard Law Review since its inception in volume 64 (1951)7 until 
 
4 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term – Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979). 
5 Cf. Colin Koopman, Foucault Across the Disciplines: Introductory Notes of Contingency in 
Critical Inquiry, 24 HIST. HUM. SCIS 1, 6–8 (2011) (“Foucault’s way of showing that discipline 
is optional was to show how discipline has been contingently made up in such a way as to be 
potentially revisable.”) (emphasis omitted). 
6 Cf. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. AND 
THEORY 3, 52–53 (1969) (“A knowledge of the history of such ideas can then serve to show the 
extent to which those features of our own arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as 
traditional or even ‘timeless’ truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our peculiar 
history and social structure.”) (footnote omitted). 
7 The Foreword published in 1951 of the 1950 Supreme Court’s term is the first one titled 
“Foreword” and signed by an author. Louis Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term – Foreword, 
65 HARV. L. REV. 107, 107 (1951). A footnote states that “[t]he purpose of this Note is to analyze 
only a few selected areas of the law which received substantial attention during the October 
Term, 1950.” Id. A year earlier, a similar footnote appeared in a section titled “The Supreme 
Court, 1949 Term.” See The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARV. L. REV. 114, 114 (1950). 
However, that section was not titled “Foreword,” nor was it signed by an author. Id. I read this 
note to confirm it does not disprove my thesis, but I do not consider it a “proper” Foreword. The 
1950 article is the first proper Foreword. The 1949 Foreword began the transition to the 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
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volume 133 (2019)8. I analyze Forewords written prior to the switch in the 
understanding of judicial legitimacy, those written during the switch, and those which 
were written after it had occurred. In my discussion, I use two markers to detect this 
change. The first marker is Hamilton’s famous dictum from The Federalist No. 78. 
The second is the countermajoritarian difficulty. As I explain in the methodological 
discussion that follows this section, if a change in understanding judicial legitimacy 
did occur, it will have manifested itself in the discussions of these markers in the 
Forewords. Before concluding, I discuss Larry Kramer’s Foreword9 which presents a 
challenge to my argument.  
In this Article, I do not attempt to elaborate on the consequences of the shift in 
understanding judicial legitimacy.10 I merely aim to show how the understanding of 
this construct has undergone a radical shift in recent decades. 
II. THE METHODOLOGY OF DEMONSTRATING A CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 
A depiction of a conceptual change means tracking the genealogy of a concept and 
showing that at a certain period the understanding of that concept changed. Take, for 
example, the shift in how we understand the concept of being “smart” today in 
comparison to Biblical times. The Bible tells us that King Solomon was considered 
the smartest of all people, because, among other things, “he uttered 3,000 proverbs.”11 
Today, a person like Solomon, who offers a proverb for every situation, would surely 
not be considered the smartest of all. Based on this example, Neil Postman argues that 
the meaning of the word “smart” has altered as a result of technological innovations.12 
In an oral society, in which memory had the utmost importance, “smart” meant the 
ability to remember things. After the invention of the printing press and more so since 
the advent of the internet, memory is far less central for our understanding of what it 
is to be smart.13  
The switch from an oral society to a print society is the explanation Postman offers 
to the shift in the meaning of the word “smart.” A theory explaining a conceptual shift 
is one way to persuade that a conceptual shift has occurred. Such explanation makes 
sense of the discrepancy between using “smart” to describe King Solomon and using 
the word “smart” in current times. Yet, an explanation—even a persuasive one—is not 
enough to demonstrate that a shift has occurred. Counterexamples can be easily found. 
One such counterexample is our current treatment of masters of the game of chess as 
 
Foreword model as before it there was no section in the Harvard Law Review focused on 
reviewing the last Court’s term. 
8 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term – Foreword: Abolition 
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
9 Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term – Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 5 (2001). 
10 For such an attempt, see Or Bassok, The Arendtian Dread: Courts with Power, 30 RATIO 
JURIS 417, 424–27 (2017). 
11 1 Kings 4:32 (Revised Standard). 
12 See NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 25 (1986). 
13 See id. 
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very smart people. This attitude is still prevailing even though there are many who 
argue that after all possible chess moves have been charted by computers, the game at 
the highest levels has become, in many ways, a contest of memory.14 Thus, in the 
context of chess masters, even in the current era, we still consider people with high 
memory skills as smart. Counterexamples show that, plausible as it may be, an 
explanation for why a conceptual shift has occurred does not equate to demonstrating 
that such a shift has indeed occurred. For this reason, my explanation for the change 
in understanding judicial legitimacy which relies on the rise of the public opinion 
polling technology is not enough. I need to demonstrate that such change has actually 
occurred. 
One technique for demonstrating a conceptual shift is to offer a “thick” description 
of the uses of the concept in question before, during, and after the period in which the 
conceptual shift has allegedly occurred.15 Take for example Samuel Moyn’s book, The 
Last Utopia: Human Rights in History.16 Moyn argues that human rights “emerged in 
the 1970s seemingly from nowhere.”17 Yet, Moyn obviously cannot argue that the 
concept of “human rights” was born in the 1970s as it existed in many languages for 
many years prior to its “emergence” in the 1970s. Moyn’s thesis is about a change in 
the way we understand human rights as a concept after the 1970s. His main rival is the 
conventional thesis according to which the shift in understanding human rights is a 
result of the lessons of the Second World War.18 
Moyn’s use of thick description was heavily criticized.19 Perhaps most 
prominently, it was claimed that his thesis of “discontinuity” between how human 
rights were understood before and after the 1970s is based on a selective narration of 
the past to fit his thesis.20 For example, Philip Alston argues that Moyn’s “thesis is 
driven with such single-mindedness, selectivity, and lack of nuance that it is 
essentially a polemic . . . .”21 Christopher McCrudden speaks of “an historical essay 
 
14 See David M. Lane & Yu-Hsuan A. Chang, Chess Knowledge Predicts Chess Memory 
Even After Controlling for Chess Experience: Evidence for the Role of High-level Processes, 
46 MEMORY & COGNITION 337 (2018) (examining various theories on the role of memory in 
playing chess). 
15  
16 SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). 
17 Id, at 3. 
18 See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term – Foreword: A Judge on Judging: 
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 42 (2002) (“We are 
experiencing a human rights revolution as a result of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust.”). 
19 In addition to his narrative-based description, Moyn included in his book as an Appendix 
a graph that documents the amount of news items in the New York Times and the London Times 
between 1785 and 1985 that included the phrase “human rights.” MOYN, supra note 16, at 231. 
20 Philip Alston, Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights: The Slave Trade 
and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2066 (2012). 
21 Id. 
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of a purely narrative variety,”22 and that Moyn “fails to join the dots.”23 Indeed, in 
reading Moyn’s relatively short narrative that covers a very long period, the reader is 
left pondering whether Moyn did not force his thesis on the vast amount of historical 
material, and cherry-picked the evidence so as to fit his narrative while neglecting 
other evidence that did not. This is a central difficulty in using the thick description as 
the methodology for proving that a conceptual change occurred. In view of the large 
amounts of data available for analyzing changes in the use of central concepts such as 
human rights or legitimacy, how can one overcome this difficulty and still be able to 
prove that a conceptual change occurred without attempting the impossible mission of 
surveying every use of the concept during the period examined? 
One well-known technique is sampling. By thoroughly investigating a narrow field 
that represents the use of the concept in a much broader field, this technique aims to 
capture the use of the concept in the entire terrain that the sample represents. The 
sampled field can be defined by limiting the investigation into a short time frame or 
by limiting it to certain media outlets.  
Sampling has its merits. It allows a thorough investigation of a narrow field. If the 
sample accurately represents the entire field it samples, then the findings emanating 
from the sample would offer valid conclusions on the entire field. But that is a big “if”.  
In earlier work, I investigated the shift in the understanding of judicial legitimacy 
using both thick description and sampling.24 In terms of thick description, I offered a 
narrative of Supreme Court adjudication in order to demonstrate such a shift.25 I also 
used two sampling techniques. First, I tracked references in the Court’s adjudication 
to Alexander Hamilton’s famous dictum from The Federalist No. 78 on judicial 
legitimacy.26 This dictum has served as a starting point for discussions on judicial 
legitimacy since the early days of the Republic. For this reason, I hypothesized that if 
there was a shift in understanding judicial legitimacy, it would be reflected in 
discussions in which reference is made to this dictum. This hypothesis proved correct, 
and I was even able to identify Justice Felix Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Baker 
v. Carr as the moment the shift began.27 In his dissent, Frankfurter paraphrased 
Hamilton’s dictum, and wrote “[t]he Court’s authority— possessed of neither the 
purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral 
sanction.”28  
 
22 See also Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Histories, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
179, 187 (2014). 
23 Id. at 192. 
24 See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
153 (2013) [hereinafter Bassok, Source of Legitimacy]. 
25 Id. at 166. 
26 See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Public Opinion Polls, 23 
CONSTELLATIONS 573 (2016) [hereinafter Bassok, Bar of Public Opinion Polls]. 
27 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962). (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 267. 
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Second, I analyzed the development of the countermajoritarian difficulty.29 This 
concept has been understood for decades as capturing the Court’s legitimacy 
difficulty.30 If there was a shift in the understanding of judicial legitimacy, one would 
expect to see it reflected in the discussions of this difficulty. My findings showed that 
the understanding of the countermajoritarian difficulty changed from viewing it as an 
inherent unsolvable difficulty focused on the unaccountable nature of the judiciary to 
a solvable difficulty focused on rulings that counter public opinion.31 
In analyzing the Harvard Forewords, I relied on insights derived from both of these 
sampling investigations. So far as the Forewords’ authors referred to Hamilton’s 
dictum from The Federalist No. 78 or used the countermajoritarian difficulty to 
elaborate their arguments, I used insights gained in my previous work to detect which 
understanding of judicial legitimacy the authors used.  
III. PAMELA KARLAN AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
Pamela Karlan concludes her 2011 Harvard Foreword titled Democracy and 
Disdain by stating “Alexander Hamilton was slightly off base when he wrote that the 
judiciary has ‘neither Force nor will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.’ The judiciary 
must ultimately depend on the people.”32 
The assumption that the Court relies on “public respect”33 or on “public 
confidence”34 cuts across Karlan’s Foreword. Karlan argues that the Court’s recent 
disdain for the elected branches undermines public confidence in the democratic 
process. She further argues: “[t]he Court’s dismissive treatment of politics raises the 
question whether, and for how long, the people will maintain their confidence in a 
Court that has lost its confidence in them and their leaders.”35  
Hamilton was not “slightly off base” as Karlan argues.36 He just viewed the 
Court’s source of legitimacy differently than Karlan. In The Federalist No. 78, 
Hamilton proclaimed that: 
 
[t]he judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse . . . It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely 
 
29 See Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
333 (2012) [hereinafter Bassok, Countermajoritarian Difficulties]. 
30 See id. at 335. 
31 See id. at 333–62. 
32 Karlan, supra note 3, at 71 (emphasis omitted). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 8, 13. 
35 Id. at 13; see also id. at 71 (“A Supreme Court that so distrusts the political process that it 
hobbles the democratic branches' capacity to provide opportunities and effective protection to 
large swathes of society will find it hard over the long run to retain public respect.”). 
36 Id. 
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judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even 
for the efficacy of its judgments.37 
 
According to Hamilton, the government’s support is an essential component for 
the efficacy of the Court’s rulings.38 This support is acquired because the executive 
branch acknowledges the value of the Court’s judgment and not because it is fearful 
of public reaction.39 Even if the Court gives a judgment that is contrary to popular 
opinion or to the government’s interests, the government will still enforce the 
judgment, in a similar way to a patient who takes the advice of her doctor and complies 
with medical treatment that causes her pain. Hamilton based the Court’s legitimacy 
“merely” on its judicial expertise; not on public support for the Court.40  
Hamilton’s position reflects the negative view of popular opinion held by many of 
the founders as well as their shared belief in legal expertise.41 The Court was designed 
to counter shifts in popular opinion that contradicted the Constitution.42 In this spirit, 
Hamilton wrote that “the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard 
against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.”43 Hamilton viewed 
professional judges as bulwarks against populist threats that could potentially arise 
from the legislative branch.44 According to this line of thought, expert knowledge is 
the tool that enables judges to safeguard the Constitution from the ill influences of 
public opinion.45 For this reason, in The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton explains that as 
 




40 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 54 (1999) (explaining that 
according to Hamilton, “a court’s only claim to authority is the force of its reason and the clear 
accuracy of its decision.”); Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. The Lawyer's 
Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 Yale 
J.L. & Human. 295, 318–20 (2011) (explaining Hamilton’s position as adhering to the 
“Federalist vision of the lawyers’ constitution” that is to be interpreted by legal experts). 
41 See, e.g., Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle over Republicanism and 
the Role of Public Opinion, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405, 410–11 (2004); PAUL O. CARRESE, THE 
CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 203 
(2003) (explaining that belief in legal expertise was so accepted “among drafters and ratifiers 
alike that, in contrast to Articles I and II there is not a word in Article III about qualifications 
for office.”). 
42 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 103–04 (2002). 
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  
44 See CARRESE, supra note 41, at 197 (explaining that Hamilton viewed the judiciary as “a 
body of lawyers elevated to the bench and serving as a depository not of force or will but legal 
judgment.”). 
45 See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1061, 1071 (2007) (explaining that according to Hamilton the judiciary was a safeguard against 
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“men selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study,” 
judges are better equipped to ensure that the Constitution would not be breached than 
elected representatives.46 The requirement of expert legal knowledge is one reason for 
Hamilton’s objection in The Federalist No. 81 to entrust the final appeal in cases in 
the hands of the elected Senate.47  
IV. GENEALOGY: JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY IN THE HARVARD FOREWORDS 
A. The Court’s Legitimacy in Harvard Forewords Prior to the Paradigm Shift 
Louis Jaffe ends his 1950 Foreword—the first Foreword to have been written48—
by speaking of the value of “inflowing respect of the profession” to the Court.49 Jaffe 
uses “respect” and “confidence” to discuss the inner dynamics between the justices 
and the legal profession. These terms are used to describe the profession’s—and not 
the public’s—attitude towards the Court.50 The notion of public confidence in the 
Court is absent. Rather, the Court is judged by its professional community as with any 
expert. 
Albert Sacks’ 1953 Foreword is the first foreword to discuss the 1954 judgment of 
Brown v. Board of Education.51 Had the Foreword been written today, it would be 
hard to imagine that a discussion of the impact of such judgment on the public support 
for the Court would be missing. Indeed, current discussions of Brown frequently raise 
this issue.52 Even the Court in Casey discussed Brown in context of public support for 
the judiciary.53 The only passage in Sacks’ Foreword that gets close to discussing 
public opinion, goes against the idea of a connection between public opinion and the 
Court’s legitimacy:  
 
surges in public opinion based on its knowledge of “strict rules and precedents”); CARRESE, 
supra note 41, at 197, 202–03. 
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
47 Id. 
48 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
49 Jaffe, supra note 7, at 114. 
50 Id. 
51 Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term – Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1954). 
52 For example, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, who explicitly speaks of the Court’s legitimacy in 
terms of public support, views Brown as the watershed moment in discussions of judicial 
legitimacy. Based on an empirical search of the word “legitimacy” in the Court’s judgments, 
Fuentes-Rohwer argues that after Brown, “the Justices have referenced warning about judicial 
legitimacy seventy-one times, and only nine times in the prior 164 years.” An explanation for 
why Brown is the watershed moment is lacking in Fuentes-Rohwer article. He disregards 
completely the fact that before 1960 there was simply no regular data on public support for the 
Court. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
505, 520 (2018). 
53 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–65 (1992); see also Bassok, Source 
of Legitimacy, supra note 24, at 184–88. 
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in those states imposing school segregation . . . there exists an inner, 
unexpressed sense that segregation and equality are like oil and water, even 
though it is accompanied by an equally strong feeling that segregation is 
nevertheless essential. It may be that such an ‘inner sense’ will not be 
dominant in electoral processes. It was, however, relevant to the problem 
before the Court, a politically sheltered institution whose function it is to seek 
to reflect the sober second thought of the community.54  
In his 1955 Foreword, Charles Fairman notes that he believes “the attack” on the 
Court following the Segregation Cases is “unjust” and that the Court “merits our 
confidence and support.”55 It is unclear exactly to whom Fairman refers in speaking 
about “our confidence and support” (the public? the professional community?) and in 
any event, there is no discussion of the connection between this support and the 
Court’s legitimacy.  
The School Prayer cases of Engel v. Vitale56 and School District v. Schempp57 are 
two additional examples of cases that current literature frequently discusses in terms 
of their impact on public support for the Court and hence on its legitimacy.58 Louis 
Pollak’s 1962 Foreword that is focused on these two cases lacks any such discussion.59 
The public reaction to the Court’s judgments is discussed, but the “Court’s authority” 
is presented as standing “against” this reaction.60 Although opinion polls began during 
the 1930s and regular measurement of public support for the Court in opinion polling 
started during the 1960s,61 no data on polling results are presented in the Foreword.  
 
54 Sacks, supra note 51, at 96. 
55 See Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term – Foreword: The Attack of the 
Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83 (1956). 
56 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
57 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
58 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 238, 264–
67, 327, 377–78, 520 n.265, 548 n.39, 549 n.42 (2009); Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, 
and the American Way: Reconstructing Engel, 67 STAN. L. REV. 479 (2015). 
59 Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme Court, 1962 Term – Forward: Public Prayers in Public 
Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62 (1963). 
60 See id. at 62 (The clamorous public hostility which greeted Engel could hardly have come 
as a great surprise to the Justices. They surely knew that in entering the lists against officially 
sponsored professions of religious faith they were pitting the Court’s authority against a vastly 
powerful adversary—an adversary which commands strong and widespread popular support . . 
. . To turn aside from enforcement of the Constitution because enforcement is unpopular would 
be wholly antithetic to one of the Court’s chief responsibilities.”).  
61 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 264 (discussing Gallup Polls on the School Prayer 
decisions). 
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While Pollak does not mention Alexander Bickel’s 1960 Foreword62 and his 1962 
book, The Least Dangerous Branch,63 Bickel’s idea of the Court’s “passive virtues” 
hovers above Pollak’s analysis. Bickel viewed public support not as the source of the 
Court’s legitimacy, but as a constraint to its true source of legitimacy—its expertise—
that may prevent it at times from following legal expertise.64 In a similar vein, Pollak 
notes that the Court avoided the issue of school prayer two years prior to its 1962 term 
by denying certiorari in order not to corrupt its source of authority.65 He explains that 
in the end, the vitality of the two School Prayer judgments “must depend upon their 
intrinsic persuasiveness.”66 And following this sentence, Pollak engages in examining 
the judgments’ doctrinal validity, not their ability to persuade the masses.67  
In his 1956 Foreword titled The Citizen’s Immunities and Public Opinion, Arthur 
Sutherland concludes his Foreword noting the “the Court has always irritated some of 
the American people.”68 He brings newspapers quotes from 1920s and the 1820s to 
make his point: critique of the Court has always existed.69 In a Foreword with “public 
opinion” in its title, at no point does Sutherland refers to the Court’s authority as 
dependent on public support or to the danger public criticism may pose to the Court’s 
legitimacy.  
In his 1958 Foreword Henry Hart explains that without “the power either in theory 
or in practice to ram its own personal preferences down other people’s throats,” all the 
Court can be is merely “a voice of reason.”70 Rather than speaking of public 
confidence as the Court’s source of legitimacy, Hart is loyal to the Hamiltonian 
expertise-based view of legitimacy. He explains that “[o]nly opinions which are 
grounded in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent can do the job which the Supreme 
Court of the United States has to do.”71 Due to failure to comply with standards of 
legal expertise, Hart is worried from a loss of confidence in the Court but only that of 
the professional community, not of the public. He writes:  
 
62 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term – Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 
75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1961). 
63 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
64 See id. at 69–71 (“When it strikes down legislative policy, the Court must act rigorously 
on principle, else it undermines the justification for its power.”); see also Bassok, 
Countermajoritarian Difficulties, supra note 29, at 365–66. 
65 Pollak, supra note 59, at 62–63. 
66 Id. at 64. 
67 See Id. at 64–78. 
68 Arthur E. Sutherland, The Supreme Court, 1956 Term – Foreword: The Citizen’s 
Immunities and Public Opinion, 71 HARV. L. REV. 85, 92 (1957). 
69 See id. at 92–93. 
70 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term – Forward: The Time Chart of the 
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959). 
71 Id.; see also id. at 125 (“[R]eason is the life of the law . . . .”). 
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It needs to be said with all possible gravity, because it is a grave thing to say, 
that these failures are threatening to undermine the professional respect of 
first-rate lawyers for the incumbent Justices of the Court, and this at the very 
time when the Court as an institution and the Justices who sit on it are 
especially in need of the bar’s confidence and support.72 
In his 1963 Foreword, Philip Kurland discusses Bickel’s book, The Least 
Dangerous Branch, but without mentioning the countermajoritarian difficulty.73 
Kurland criticizes the Court mainly for its inability to follow the path of legal 
expertise. He points out that the Court’s judgments offer “‘hallowed catchword and 
formula’ in place of reasons” and fail to follow precedents.74 Yet, interestingly he 
concludes his foreword noting that  
The time has probably not yet come for an avowal that, in the field of public 
law, ‘judicial power’ does not describe a different function but only a 
different forum and that the subject of constitutional law should be turned 
back to the political scientists . . . . The Court will continue to play the role 
of the omniscient and strive toward omnipotence. And the law reviews will 
continue to play the game of evaluating the Court’s work in light of the 
fictions of the law, legal reasoning, and legal history rather than deal with the 
realities of politics and statesmanship.75 
While in this paragraph Kurland speaks of legal expertise as a realm of fiction and 
of politics as the true reality of judicial power, the Hamiltonian idea that the Court 
relies on the other branches rather than on public opinion is still controlling his 
analysis. Hence, Kurland writes  
It would appear that those who have feared that the Court, by asserting its 
powers too frequently and too vehemently, would risk its own destruction 
have been wrong. So long as the third branch – ‘the least dangerous branch’ 
– does not arouse effective opposition from both of the other branches of the 
national government at the same time, it is in no serious danger of being 
curbed.76 
Kurland thus does not share Karlan’s premise that “[t]he judiciary must ultimately 
depend on the people.”77 
It is striking to compare current Harvard Forewords where the discussion of 
judicial legitimacy in terms of public support is prevalent to Forewords from before 
 
72 Id. at 101. 
73 Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term – Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal 
in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 
169, 175 (1964). 
74 Id. at 169-75 (footnote omitted). 
75 Id. at 175. 
76 Id. 
77 Karlan, supra note 3, at 71. 
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the 1970s, where discussion of judicial legitimacy is scarce. As the pool of Forewords 
is a pre-determined sample of scholarship, this absence is not an absence of evidence. 
Rather, it is evidence of absence. In other words, if the Harvard Forewords indeed 
reflect the scholarly discourse on American constitutional law, the scarce discussion 
of the Court’s legitimacy in the 1950s and 1960s in comparison to the ample 
discussion of judicial legitimacy in terms of public support in the decades afterwards 
supports the argument that this understanding of judicial legitimacy arose later.  
In every epoch there are some assumptions that are considered so commonsensical 
that people do not explicate them because no other way of putting things has ever 
occurred to them.78 Martha Minow addresses this point in her Foreword noting that a 
certain “perspective may go unstated because it is so powerful and pervasive that it 
may be presumed without defense.”79 In the Forewords, until the 1960s, an unstated 
presumption was that a court that fails in the test of legal expertise fails in the 
legitimacy test as well. According to this line of thinking, the almost complete lack of 
discussion of judicial legitimacy in Forewords prior to the 1970s, coupled with a 
strong emphasis on analyzing doctrinal failings of the Court throughout the 1950s and 
the 1960s, are to be explained as manifestations of an embedded assumption that 
legitimacy is to be understood in terms of expertise.  
Remnants of this understanding of judicial legitimacy continued to exist in the 
Forewords years later. In his 1978 Foreword, Owen Fiss explains that the Court’s 
legitimacy depends “not on the consent—implied or otherwise—of the people, but 
rather on [its] competence, on the special contribution [it] make[s] to the quality of 
our social life.”80 Fiss adds that only the government as a whole (the regime), and not 
specific institutions, depends on the support of the people.81 
B. When did the Paradigm Shift Occur in the Harvard Forewords? 
As with other historical processes, it is an elusive endeavor to find the exact 
starting point for a change in the understanding of a concept.82 Limiting the scope of 
inquiry to the Harvard Forewords makes the task of identifying the time of the shift 
in understanding judicial legitimacy manageable, yet still quite tricky.  
In his 1977 Foreword, John Hart Ely wrote that while Hamilton’s The Federalist 
No. 78 “must have made a good bit of sense at the outset of our nation . . . . Time has 
 
78 See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODREN WORLD 49 (1925); JOHN H. 
HALLOWELL, THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 2 (1946). 
79 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term – Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 10, 54 (1987). 
80 Fiss, supra note 4, at 38. 
81 Id.; see also Owen M. Fiss, Two Models of Adjudication, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION 
SECURE RIGHTS? 36, 43–44 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985) 
(“[C]onsent is not granted separately to individual institutions. It extends to the system of 
governance as a whole. Although the legitimacy of the system depends on the people’s consent, 
an institution within the system does not depend on popular consent . . . .”). 
82 See MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN’S CRAFT 25 (Peter Putnam trans., 1954) (“[F]or most 
historical realities the very notion of a starting-point remains singularly elusive.”). 
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proven Hamilton’s vision on this score badly mistaken.”83 Contrary to Karlan, Ely 
does not think Hamilton is “slightly off base when he wrote” his dictum in 1788.84 
Rather, Ely believes that while at the time Hamilton wrote his famous dictum it made 
sense, the Warren Court’s resilience to public backlash showed it is not the weakest 
of branches anymore.85 In order to prove this resilience, Ely refers to three sources.86 
The third is a news report on a “1977 Harris survey that ranked the Court high in public 
confidence.”87 The two other sources are law review articles that offer an 
impressionistic assessment of “the prestige”88 and “respect”89 of the Supreme Court. 
One of the articles is Henry Monaghan’s 1974 Foreword; the other is a 1976 article 
by Archibald Cox.90 Monaghan and Cox’s respective claims about public support for 
the Court are assessments about the public’s mood rather than measurements of public 
support in the aggregate form we are familiar with today. These two lack any 
references to substantiate their assertions, and both use tentative phrasing.91 While Ely 
is the first scholar who connects in the Harvard Forewords between public opinion 
polling data and the legitimacy of the Court, there were some earlier signs for the 
upcoming shift in the understanding of judicial legitimacy.  
It is not surprising to find first signs of the shift in the 1961 Foreward written by 
Robert McCloskey, the then-Chairman of the Department of Government at 
Harvard.92 Once the conceptual shift occurred, political scientists became the most 
enthusiastic adherents of public opinion polling as a metric for assessing judicial 
 
83 John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term – Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental 
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 18–19 (1978). 
84 Karlan, supra note 3, at 71. 
85 Ely, supra note 83, at 21. 
86 Id. at 21 n.78. 
87 Id. (“Wash. Post, July 10, 1978, at A4, col. I (reporting 1977 Harris survey that ranked the 
Court high in public confidence).”). 
88 Archibald Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitution Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791, 
826–27 (1976). 
89 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Foreword: Constitution Common 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1975). 
90 See id.; Cox, supra note 88, at 791. 
91 See Cox, supra note 88, at 827 (“Still, the prestige of the Supreme Court is surely greater 
today than that of other branches of government, and I am inclined to think that it has never 
been higher.”); Monaghan, supra note 101, at 1 (“[T]he Court’s claim to be the ‘ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution’ appears to command more universal respect today than at any 
time since Chief Justice Marshall invoked that document . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
92 See Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term – Foreword: The 
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1962). 
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legitimacy.93 It is no wonder then that McCloskey—as one of the pioneers of 
researching judicial behavior by using political science methods—showed the way.94 
McCloskey’s Foreword is focused on Baker v. Carr95 and is titled The 
Reapportionment Case. In his Foreword, McCloskey uses concepts and ideas from the 
world of public opinion research such as “latent consensus” or the idea of institutions 
lagging behind public opinion.96 Yet, data from opinion polls measuring support for 
the Court or its judgments is absent from his Foreword.  
McCloskey discusses the Court’s source of legitimacy, and in this context, he 
quotes Justice Frankfurter’s line from Baker v. Carr in which Hamilton’s famous 
dictum from The Federalist No. 78 is paraphrased.97 Yet, McCloskey does not detect 
the connection between Frankfurter’s line and Hamilton’s dictum. He thus fails to 
detect the radical difference between viewing the Court’s legitimacy in terms of 
expertise as Hamilton suggested (“judgment”) and viewing it in terms of public 
support (“public confidence”) as Frankfurter wrote.98  
I will further address the paraphrasing of Hamilton’s dictum later in my argument. 
For the purposes of analyzing McCloskey’s Foreword, it is important to notice how 
the entry of ideas coming from public opinion research are starting to impact the terms 
in which judicial legitimacy is discussed. Thus, McCloskey acknowledges the 
connection between public opinion and the Court’s authority.99 Moreover, in the last 
paragraph of his Foreword, he notes that the compliance with the decision in Baker 
“may indicate that the decision has activated a latent consensus in American 
opinion.”100 He then adds that before the justices proceed to the next issue, “they 
would be well advised to speculate about the precise nature of this consensus they 
 
93 David Adamany & Stephen Meinhold, Robert Dahl: Democracy, Judicial Review, and the 
Study of Law and Courts, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 361, 373 (Nancy Maveety 
ed., 2003) (“[B]y the mid-1980s, public opinion polls of one kind or another had been conducted 
for almost half a century, and scholars began to closely examine the relationship between the 
Court’s decisions and public opinion.”). 
94 See Howard Gillman, Robert McCloskey, Historical Institutionalism and the Art of 
Judicial Governance, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 336, 336 (Nancy Maveety ed., 
2003). 
95 McClosky, supra note 92, at 63 (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1962)). 
96 Id. at 59, 74. 
97 See id. at 67. For the discussion of Frankfurter’s paraphrasing of the Federalist No. 78 see 
the text accompanying fn 27-28. 
98 Bassok, Bar of Public Opinion Polls, supra note 26, at 580–81 (explaining the complexity 
of Frankfurter’s position and arguing that the current use of his quote from Baker v. Carr distorts 
his position). 
99 See McCloskey, supra note 92, at 67 (“If the public should ever become convinced that 
the Court is merely another legislature, that judicial review is only a euphemism for an 
additional layer in the legislative process, the Court’s future as a constitutional tribunal would 
be cast in grave doubt.”). 
100 Id. at 74. 
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seem to have aroused. Speculation it must be, for there are few certainties about such 
matters.”101 While the tool for measurement of public opinion was already known at 
the time McCloskey wrote the Foreword, data from regular measurements of public 
support for the Court and its judgments were still not readily available.102 For this 
reason, McCloskey writes that justices can only “speculate” on the actual 
measurements of public support for the Court’s judgments.103 Thus, while the 
Foreword lacks the data produced by using the metric for measuring “consensus,” the 
terminology of public opinion polling is already affecting the discussion.  
Three years later, Paul Mishkin writes in his 1964 Foreword of “public support 
that is the ultimate foundation of the Court’s power.”104 In 1965, Archibald Cox writes 
in his Foreword:  
[c]onstitutional government must operate by consent of the governed. Court 
decrees draw no authority from the participation of the people. Their power 
to command consent depends upon more than habit or even the deserved 
prestige of the Justices. It comes to an important degree from the continuing 
force of the rule of law—from the belief that the major influence in judicial 
decisions is not fiat but principles which bind the judges as well as the 
litigants and apply consistently yesterday, today, and tomorrow . . . . A chief 
function of the judicial opinion is to preserve this element in the Court’s 
power to command the consent of the governed.105  
While Cox’s discussion of Brown and the sit-in cases raises issues of “public 
acceptance” and “degree of assent,”106 it still lacks any discussion of measurable 
public support for the Court. 
When reading these Forewords from the 1960s, one must bear in mind that they 
were written during a unique period in time. Scientific public opinion polling was 
invented in the 1930s,107 yet it was not until the 1960s that the Gallup and Harris 
organization began to track public support for the Court and its decisions in any 
systematic way.108 Before the 1960s—and surely before the 1930s—it was very 
 
101 Id.  
102 Bassok, Source of Legitimacy, supra note 24, at 157-58. 
103 McCloskey, supra note 92, at 74. 
104 Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term – Foreword: The High Court, The Great 
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 67 (1965). 
105 Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term – Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication 
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 98 (1966).  
106 See id. at 94.  
107 See, e.g., John Durham Peters, Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion, in 
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 3, 14 (Theodore L. Glasser & Charles 
T. Salmon eds., 1995). 
108 See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 1–2, 29, 77 
(2008) (“Until the 1930s there was no direct test by which to tell whether or not Supreme Court 
decision agreed with American public opinion.”); Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor 
the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 
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difficult to speak of the Court as holding public support. There was no reliable public 
evidence that enabled one to view the Court’s legitimacy in terms of public support.  
Until the 1930s, the democratic legitimation of political power had been controlled 
by elections that were considered the most reliable mechanism for determining the 
will of the people.109 In that state of affairs, public attitudes toward the Court, 
independent of those expressed by Congress, could have been deduced only indirectly, 
in a crude and imprecise manner, from the rare occasions when the Court was raised 
as an issue in national presidential campaigns.110 The news media could also provide 
an impressionistic indication of how the public perceived the Court. But besides 
elections, no other source of data could give direct, regular, and reliable measurements 
of what the public was thinking.111 This point was illustrated by Arthur Sutherland in 
his 1956 Foreword where he points out that “[i]f journalistic comment reflects popular 
opinion, a large number of Americans are thinking of this year as ‘the time the 
Supreme Court went wrong on all those Communist cases.’”112 An attempt to make a 
similar statement today would have to be supported by reference to public opinion 
polls.  
The 1960s was a period in which public opinion polls measuring support for the 
Court had already been introduced, but there were still no regular measurements of 
public support for the Court that were published in popular media. Opinion polls in 
general still lacked their current hold on the public’s mind.113  
True, even before the invention of public opinion polls, several Justices did write 
that the Court “operates by its influence, by public confidence.”114 Similarly, one can 
find quotes of the founders speaking of “the public deference to and confidence in the 
 
1210–12 (1986); Roger Handberg, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 1935-
1981, 59 INT’L. SOC. SCI. REV. 3, 5 (1984). 
109 See, e.g., STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 
(2010) (“Since Jean-Jacques Rousseau . . . the legitimate exercise of political power has been 
associated with elections that provide a mechanism for determining the will of the people.”). 
110 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 190 (2004) (“In the absence of polling data or other means of obtaining 
a more refined picture of public opinion, it is difficult to gauge with any precision public 
sentiments on a question like judicial supremacy.”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 177–80 
(noting that “[j]udicial review was a major issue in three presidential campaigns” and pointing 
on the 1896, 1912 and 1924 elections). 
111 See ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION: ITS ORIGINS, CONTENT AND 
IMPACT 23 (2d ed., 1980) (“Before the advent of public opinion polls in the early 1930s, one had 
to rely on much more inexact measures of what the public was thinking . . . . But the most relied 
upon method of assessing public opinion prior to the opinion poll was the interpretation of 
election results, and the occasional referendum that managed to find its way onto the ballot.”). 
112 See Sutherland, supra note 68, at 87. 
113 Bassok, Bar of Public Opinion Polls, supra note 26, at 575. 
114 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 618 (1840); see also United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196, 223 (1882). 
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judgment” of the judiciary.115 But remember the difference between understanding 
the word “smart” in the sentence “King Salmon was the smartest person of his time” 
and understanding the same word in our era for example, in the sentence “Ludwig 
Wittgenstein was the smartest person of his time.” Similarly, we need to read 
statements on “public confidence” written before the rise of public opinion polling 
through different “eyeglasses” than similar statements made by the current Court or 
by current politicians. For example, the latter quote read in context uses the term 
“public deference and confidence” as saying that the public should or would support 
the judiciary rather than as saying that the judiciary holds or requires a measurable 
level of public support.116 On other occasions, public opinion was understood not as 
a simple aggregate of individual opinions, but as a diffused public state of mind 
expressed by institutions such as Congress.117  
European courts’ use of the formula “in the name of the people” to invoke the 
authority of the democratic sovereign can also teach us an important lesson.118 This 
formula reflects an older concept of popular sovereignty that is detached from the 
actual public support of the here and now as measured in public opinion polls.119 
According to this concept, the democratic subject is a single collective rather than the 
accumulation of individual voices.120 The views of the actual public–rather than an 
abstract fictive public–were still not the measure for judicial legitimacy.  
The shift towards a measurable understanding of the concept of the “people” began 
with the acceptance of elections as the tool for capturing the voice of the “real” 
people.121 This shift meant that the persuasive power of pro-forma statements of 
courts proclaiming to speak in the name of an abstract “people” lost much of its 
 
115 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 91 (quoting James Madison’s letter from 1834). 
116 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 146 (continuing the quote by Madison in which he wrote 
that “[w]ithout losing sight, therefore, of the coordinate relations of the three departments to 
each other, it may always be expected that the judicial bench, when happily filled, will for the 
reasons suggested, most engage the respect and reliance of the public as the surest expositor of 
the Constitution . . . .”). 
117 See LEO BOGART, POLLS AND THE AWARENESS OF PUBLIC OPINION 14–15 (1985) (“The 
term ‘public opinion’ as used in polling is quite distinct from the historical concept of public 
opinion as a state of mind . . . .”); Amy Fried & Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the Polls, 
72 HISTORIAN 321, 341 (2010) (arguing that in that in the period before the invention of public 
opinion polls, “Congress was public opinion.”). 
118 See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of 
International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR J. INT'L L. 7, 7–
8 (2012) [hereinafter Bogdandy & Venzke 2012]. 
119 See ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME?: A PUBLIC LAW THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 20 (2014) [hereinafter BOGDANDY & VENZKE 2014]. 
120 See Bogdandy & Venzke 2012, supra note 118, at 140. 
121 Cf. Kramer, supra note 110, at 128 (quoting Benjamin Rush’s explanation from 1787 that 
the power of the people is possessed “only on the days of their election.”). 
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power.122 As Edward White shows, in the United States, by the early twentieth 
century, “the people” had taken the meaning of voting majorities.123 
Several decades of constant polling reshaped the notion of democratic legitimacy 
in the United States.124 In “the Age of Democracy,” as Richard Pildes titles the current 
age in the opening sentence to his 2003 Foreword,125 the tendency in the United States 
to understand democracy in majoritarian terms has strengthened,126 and the term 
“public opinion” has come to be synonymous with opinion poll results.127 Since the 
1980s and the rise of “public opinion culture,” opinion polls operate in public 
discourse as an authoritative democratic legitimator.128 In recent decades, any salient 
issue that has been brought before the Court has been polled, before the Court’s 
decision and after it, as part of the general frenzy to poll every issue in American 
public discourse.129 Speaking in the name of the people has been transformed, at least 
in the United States, so as to mean not the voice of one collective entity but an 
aggregate of individual opinions as measured in opinion polls.  
In view of this transitionary period, it is no surprise that a year after Ely, Fiss would 
still follow the Hamiltonian line of thinking. In his 1978 Foreword, Fiss wrote that in 
 
122 See Fried & Harris, supra note 117, at 341; Or Bassok, The Schmitelsen Court: The 
Question of Legitimacy, 21 GER. L.J. 131, 136 (2020) [hereinafter Bassok, Schmitelsen Court] 
(analyzing Carl Schmitt’s argument that facing a democratically elected institution rather than 
the monarch means that in terms of democratic legitimacy the judiciary possesses an inferior 
basis of democratic legitimacy). 
123 See EDWARD G. WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, VOLUME III: 1930-2000, at 9 (2019). 
124 See, e.g., BOGART, supra note 117, at xxx (“Not only polling, but the publication and 
serious acceptance of polls by the public have introduced into the political process the notion of 
an independent criterion of legitimacy in the conduct of government.”). 
125 Richard Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term – Foreword: The Constitutionalization 
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 29 (2004) (“This is the Age of Democracy.”). 
126 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy 
of Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 291 (2002) (“[W]e accept (to a certain extent) a ‘populist’ 
form of democracy in which all of the elected branches are understood to be directly elected by 
the people (the electoral college notwithstanding), and there is a direct role for public opinion 
in the form of polls, initiatives, and referenda.”). 
127 See, e.g., BOGART, supra note 117, at xxix (“[O]ur understanding of public opinion today 
is inseparable from our familiarity with opinion polls . . . .”); SUSAN HERBST, NUMBERED VOICES 
63 (1993) (“[S]cholars writing from the 1940s to the present have been forced to contend with 
the notion that polls are becoming synonymous with public opinion.”). 
128 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75–76 
(2010) (discussing the process in which public opinion polls “not only supplement but displace 
election returns as the authoritative democratic legitimator”); Peters, supra note 107, at 14 
(arguing that since the 1930s, “the polling of ‘public opinion’ has been installed as both a 
symbol of democratic life and a cog in the machinery of the market and the state”). 
129 See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 
2008) (presenting public opinion polls conducted to examine public views on the most central 
issues in which the Court has decided in recent decades). 
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a democracy, only the government as a whole—rather than the Court as a distinct 
institution—depends on the support of the people.130 A year later, Ely already 
expressed a revisionist position. According to Ely, Hamilton was not “off base” at the 
time he wrote The Federalist No. 78, as Karlan argued. His position had merit “at the 
outset of our nation.”131 However, Hamilton came to be wrong, and the Court is not 
the weakest branch any more by the time Ely writes his Foreword, and to prove that 
he points to a new source of legitimacy: public support as measured by Harris polls.132 
As opposed to Karlan, Ely writes during a transitionary period, before the current 
paradigm that controls the understanding of the Court’s source of legitimacy became 
dominant. For this reason, he is able to imagine the past better than Karlan and to 
depict more accurately the institutional dynamics envisioned by Hamilton during a 
period in which the Court’s legitimacy was understood as relying on a source of 
legitimacy other than public support. For Karlan, the past is colored by the current 
understanding of judicial legitimacy, and through this perspective, Hamilton was off 
base.  
In order to demonstrate how the shift in understanding judicial legitimacy came 
into play in the Harvard Forewords, in the following parts of this Article, I focus on a 
concept that served as the site for debates over the Court’s legitimacy for decades: the 
countermajoritarian difficulty.133 After briefly describing this concept and the change 
it went through as a result of the invention of public opinion polling, I examine how 
the authors of the Harvard Forewords discussed this concept as part of their 
discussions on the Court’s legitimacy. 
C. The Period of Shifting Understandings: The Countermajoritarian Difficulty 
as a Marker 
1. Bickel and the Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties 
One very important marker which helps demonstrate the shift in the understanding 
of judicial legitimacy is the countermajoritarian difficulty (hereinafter: CM difficulty). 
Alexander Bickel, who coined the term “CM difficulty” in his 1962 book The Least 
Dangerous Branch,134 did not yet envision it in his 1960 Foreword. In his Foreword, 
Bickel identifies judicial review as “at least potentially a deviant institution in a 
 
130 See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. The transitionary period between the two 
understandings of judicial legitimacy may also explain why Lawrence Tribe’s Foreword which 
is focused on analyzing Roe v. Wade does not mention opinion polls. Tribe’s discussion is 
doctrinal and is based on the premise that the Court’s legitimacy is understood in terms of 
expertise. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term – Foreword: Toward a Model 
of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
131 Ely, supra note 83, at 18–19; Karlan, supra note 3, at 71. 
132 Ely, supra note 83, at 21. 
133 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 419 (2010) (noting that Bickel’s countermajoritarian difficulty, “[f]or 
at least a generation after he posed this problem in 1962 . . . the field of academic constitutional 
law was obsessed with solving it”). 
134 BICKEL, supra note 63, at 16. 
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democratic society.”135 However, while a similar sentence is part of his discussion of 
the CM difficulty in his 1962 book,136 in his 1960 Foreword this observation has yet 
to morph into the CM difficulty.  
In its original formulation, the CM difficulty raises the difficulty of remotely 
accountable judges that have the authority to invalidate legislation enacted by 
electorally accountable representatives.137 Bickel did not understand the difficulty in 
terms of public support. Understanding judicial legitimacy in such terms was still not 
dominant in his era. For this reason, Bickel wrote that “[m]ost assuredly, no 
democracy operates by taking continuous nose counts on the broad range of daily 
governmental activities.”138 However, he was not oblivious to the future potential 
effects of the new polling technology on the role of the Court and explained that 
“[s]urely the political institutions are more fitted than the Court to find and express an 
existing consensus – so long, at least, as the science of public sampling is no further 
developed than it is.”139 
The CM difficulty as understood by Bickel was thus not about countering the 
majority of the public as reflected in public opinion polls. Bickel was focused on what 
I dub as “the traditional understanding of the CM difficulty” that captures the problem 
of Justices striking down statutes that are the fruits of electorally accountable 
branches.140 An unelected court that enjoys public support and whose decisions are in 
line with public opinion still raises the CM difficulty in its traditional sense when it 
reviews legislation, because it is electorally unaccountable.141 
Decades after Bickel coined the difficulty, a different—literal—understanding of 
it arose. The literal understanding of the CM difficulty emphasizes the majoritarian 
component of democracy, i.e., the correspondence between the Court’s judgments and 
the aggregated preferences of the populace.142 When the Court rules counter to the 
views of the majority, as quantified by polling, it is acting in a literal CM fashion.  
 
135 Bickel, supra note 62, at 47. 
136 See BICKEL, supra note 63, at 18 (“[T]he essential reality that judicial review is a deviant 
institution in the American democracy.”). 
137 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 
GEO. L. J. 491, 492 (1997). On the centrality of accountability to Bickel’s thought, see Guido 
Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term – Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional 
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 103–04 
(1991). 
138 BICKEL, supra note 63, at 17. 
139 Id. at 239. 
140 Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan, Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?, 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 13, 14 (2013). 
141 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4–5 (1980) (“[T]he central 
function, and it is at the same time the central problem, of judicial review: a body that is not 
elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people’s elected 
representatives that they cannot govern as they’d like.”). 
142 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 
2596 (2003) (“There is a regrettable lack of clarity in the relevant scholarship about what 
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These two CM difficulties are obviously connected. As Michael Perry notes, “one 
important reason we value electorally accountable policymaking is that we think it 
more sensitive to the sentiments of the majorities than is policymaking that is not 
electorally accountable.”143 Indeed, laws enacted by accountable legislators ordinarily 
reflect majoritarian preferences.144 Striking down laws is thus usually CM in both 
senses. Yet, there are still cases in which the difference between the two CM 
difficulties is revealed. When the Court strikes down legislation that the majority of 
the public, as measured in public opinion polls, opposes, the Court’s decision is not 
CM in the literal sense because the public supports the decision.145 However, it is still 
CM in the traditional sense because an unaccountable institution thwarted the will of 
an accountable institution.146  
This distinction correlates with a dramatic difference in how these two difficulties 
are confronted. The literal CM difficulty can be dissolved and even solved if the Court 
is not countering public opinion as measured in public opinion polls.147 The traditional 
CM difficulty cannot be solved.148 Unless judges are elected by the public, the Court 
will always be unaccountable to the public in comparison to elected institutions. In 
other words, an unelected court that enjoys public support and whose decisions are in 
line with public opinion still raises the CM difficulty in its traditional sense when it 
reviews legislation, because it is electorally unaccountable. For this reason, the only 
way to confront the traditional CM difficulty is by providing reasons for why the 
unaccountable judiciary should hold this power. Such reasons or justifications are 
usually based on a special property which makes the Court, the institution, best fitted 
 
‘countermajoritarian’ actually means. At bottom it often seems to be a claim, and perhaps must 
be a claim, that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based upon constitutional 
requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of the citizenry.”). 
143 MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 170 n.4 (1982). 
144 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (“The primary and most reliable 
indication of [a national] consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws.” (quoting Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989))). 
145 See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY, supra note 129, at 5 (“After all, if the Court merely reflected public opinion in 
its decisions, then whatever other problems it might have, it could not be described as 
countermajoritarian.”); Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of 
Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 283 (2010) (“Recent scholarship 
in political science and law challenges the claim that judicial review in the United States poses 
what Alexander Bickel famously called the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty.’”). 
146 See David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, at 
xxxix (David Kairys ed. 3d ed. 1998) (“[W]hen legislatures act counter to the will or inclinations 
of the majority of their constituents, judicial invalidation of legislation can be both majoritarian 
(in the sense that most people support it) and countermajoritarian (in the sense that a court is 
negating the action of a majoritarian institution).”). 
147 See Bassok & Dotan, supra note 140, at 14. 
148 See id. at 14–15, 23–24. 
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to ensure society’s adherence to the right constitutional course.149 In other words, the 
Court has to have expertise in some field.150 This is the connection between the 
traditional CM difficulty and understanding judicial legitimacy in terms of expertise. 
If the Court has proper expertise, its CM authority can be justified, and the Court 
possesses legitimacy.151 In the same vein, understanding judicial legitimacy in terms 
of public support corresponds to the literal CM difficulty. If the Court holds public 
support, the literal CM difficulty does not exist, and the Court possesses legitimacy.152  
The distinction between the traditional formulation of the CM difficulty and the 
literal formulation will assist me in distinguishing between Forewords that adhere to 
the understanding of judicial legitimacy in terms of expertise and ones that adhere to 
the understanding of judicial legitimacy in terms of public support. As the CM 
difficulty has been understood to encapsulate the Court’s legitimacy problem, one 
would expect that the difficulty would be discussed in terms that correspond to the 
paradigm controlling the understanding of judicial legitimacy in that era. In a period 
in which judicial legitimacy is understood in terms of expertise, one would expect to 
find discussions of the CM difficulty in its traditional sense. Conversely, in a period 
in which judicial legitimacy is understood in terms of public support, one would expect 
to find discussions of the CM difficulty in its literal sense. If, during the period in 
which I argue that judicial legitimacy was understood in terms of expertise, one finds 
discussions of the CM difficulty in its literal sense then something is amiss with my 
argument. 
2. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty in the Harvard Forewords 
In his 1980 Foreword, Lawrence Sager discusses the “tension between democratic 
theory and the Supreme Court’s prominent role as constitutional adjudicator.”153 He 
explains that this tension is “often reflected in questions about the ‘legitimacy’ of 
modern federal constitutional adjudication.”154 He then adds that “[l]egitimacy here 
means compatibility with the principle of majority rule – a principle normally realized 
in our society through the mechanism of rulemaking by elected, politically 
accountable officials.”155 While not mentioning it by name, Sager essentially speaks 
 
149 Id. at 15. 
150 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 1–3 (2001) 
(“Most scholars and judges assume that the Court’s power is justifiable (if at all) on the basis of 
its special legal expertise . . . . This view is common ground among people who disagree 
radically about . . . the nature of legal craftsmanship.”) (emphasis in original). 
151 See Bassok & Dotan, supra note 140, at 15-16. 
152 Id. at 16-17. 
153 Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term – Foreword: Constitutional 
Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 17, 38 (1981). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 38. 
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of the CM difficulty in its traditional sense: a tension between the accountable 
legislature and the unelected Court.156 
Robert Cover also adheres to the traditional definition of the CM difficulty in his 
1982 Foreword.157 Cover explicitly mentions the CM difficulty and characterizes it 
as “an insoluble confrontation between principle and process” created by the “veto 
exercised . . . by an unelected judge.”158 In line with the traditional understanding of 
the CM difficulty, Cover argues that the inherent tension at the core of the difficulty 
cannot be solved by public support for the Court, even though it can be mitigated by 
a close identity “between administration and popular politics.”159 For Cover, the CM 
difficulty begins with James Thayer’s 1893 criticism of judicial review, and Bickel 
merely offered a catchy term as part of a transformation of terms.160  
Like Sager and Cover, Erwin Chemerinsky in his 1988 Foreword still follows the 
traditional definition of the CM difficulty in explaining that “Bickel argued that 
judicial review is anti-democratic in that unelected judges invalidate the decision of 
popularly elected officials.”161 Chemerinsky explicitly rejects the view of democracy 
“as government decision accurately reflecting the preferences of the citizens . . . .”162 
However, he recognizes the rising dominance in the Court’s judgments of 
understanding democracy in mechanical majoritarian terms.163 He speaks of the 
“majoritarian paradigm” and the unjustified emphasis it gives to the question of 
“which branch is more ‘democratic.’”164 Chemerinsky argues that “[t]he critical 
issues are substantive disputes about values” and that “[t]he rhetoric of the 
majoritarian paradigm masks these critical issues . . . .”165 
Chemerinsky’s Foreword does not mention opinion polling and has yet to fully 
digest its impact on constitutional thinking. Nonetheless, the impact of the public 
opinion culture is already present as Chemerinsky aspires that the Court would “break 
free from the majoritarian paradigm that constrains its analysis and the development 
of constitutional theory.”166  
 
156 See id. at 41 (speaking of jurisdiction limitations on federal courts “[a]s a majoritarian 
check on an unaccountable judiciary . . . .”). 
157 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
158 Id. at 57. 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 57 n.158. 
161 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term – Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 70 (1989); see also id. at 74, 102. 
162 Id. at 82; see also id. at 81 n.173. 
163 Id. at 64–65, 87–89 (“[D]emocracy increasingly came to mean majority rule . . . .”). 
164 Id. at 87, 98–100. 
165 Id. at 87. 
166 Id. at 99–100. 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss1/5
2021] BEYOND THE HORIZONS OF THE HARVARD FOREWORDS 25 
Morton Horwitz’s 1992 Foreword offers another step in the process of the 
paradigm shift.167 Horwitz argues that around the 1940s, “[d]emocracy suddenly 
became a central legitimating concept in American constitutional law.”168 Even 
though he refers to Chemerinsky’s Foreword in his discussion of the CM difficulty,169 
Horwitz’s version of the CM difficulty adopts the “mechanical” version of democracy 
that Chemerinsky explicitly rejected.170 He writes that “[I]n fact, in order to limit 
judicial review, New Deal ideologues narrowly and mechanically defined democracy 
simply to entail majority rule [refers to Chemerinsky’s Foreword]. Judicial review 
eventually came to be characterized negatively as ‘counter-majoritarian’ . . . [refers to 
Bickel].”171 The shift is small, almost undetectable. In discussing Bickel’s CM 
difficulty, Horwitz jumps from majority rule immediately to the CM difficulty. There 
is no mention—as there was in Sager and Chemerinsky’s Forewords—of the elected 
accountable legislature, which is not always fully responsive to public opinion. 
Horwitz’s Foreword shows signs of the transformation of the CM difficulty because 
he defines it—contrary to Bickel’s definition—more in terms of responsiveness to 
majority opinion rather than in terms of accountability.172  
The earliest signs of a change in describing the CM difficulty that reflect the 
transformation in understanding judicial legitimacy can be detected seven years earlier 
in Frank Michelman’s 1985 Foreword.173 Early in his discussion, Michelman presents 
the Court as “irredeemably an undemocratic institution” “vis-à-vis the people.”174 
Throughout his Foreword, he focuses on the manner in which “the people” express 
their current voice and depicts progress in the attempt to make “the people” more 
“actual.”175 
Michelman begins by describing the difference in the meaning Hamilton and 
Bickel ascribe to the concept of “the voice of the people.” He explains that 
“[a]ccording to Hamilton, the Constitution speaks the democratic will of the sovereign 
 
167 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term – Foreword: The Constitution of 
Change Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30 (1993). 
168 Id. at 57, 61, 63. 
169 Id. at 62–63. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 61–62. 
172 While Minow does not discuss in her 1986 foreword the CM difficulty, she also speaks 
of judicial legitimacy in terms of responsiveness. See Minow, supra note 79, at 81 (“Judges can 
and should act as representatives, standing in for others and symbolizing society itself. Judicial 
acts of representation must also be responsive to the demands of the people they govern, in order 
to secure apparent legitimacy and, ultimately, to remain effective.”). 
173 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term – Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76–77 (1986). 
174 Id. at 16. 
175 Id. at 60–65. 
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people, which binds both Congress and the courts.”176 According to Michelman, 
Bickel presented a more realist view of “the people” than Hamilton. Rather than an 
abstract entity, the “actual people” speak through their elected representatives.177 This 
description of progression in capturing the voice of the people leads from Hamilton, 
who viewed the voice of the people as the sovereign will embodied in the Constitution, 
to Bickel who aimed to demystify the notion of “the people” and show that the 
people’s will is captured by their elected representatives. According to Michelman’s 
depiction, in attempting to present the people’s voice in a demystified manner, Bickel 
discovers the CM difficulty: the unaccountable Court that speaks in the name of the 
Constitution, confronts the accountable Congress, that speaks in the name of the actual 
people.178  
Yet, Michelman contests Bickel’s view that the voice of the people is better 
captured by the legislature than by the Court. Based on his reading of Bruce 
Ackerman’s work, Michelman notes that from the perspective of locating the voice of 
the people, Congress is not that different from Hamilton’s constitution-making 
sovereign. It also speaks in the name of an abstract notion of the people rather than the 
“real” people. “The people” are not in any useful sense “in” Congress.179 Rather, 
“Congress ‘represents’ the people in the far more attenuated sense of ‘standing in’ for 
them during their vacations into privacy . . . .”180 
According to Michelman, the next step beyond Bickel’s partial-realistic view is 
Ackerman’s dualist model. According to this model, in certain periods “[w]e the 
People actually speak” and informally amend the Constitution even if they do not 
follow the formal procedure established by Article V for amending the 
Constitution.181 By showing that the “actual” people speak for themselves in 
“constitutional moments,”182 Michelman explains that “[i]n a total reversal of 
Bickel’s view, Ackerman finally demystifies representation…”183  
Michelman claims that Ackerman’s project aims to answer Bickel’s CM difficulty. 
According to Ackerman, in times of enhanced constitutional deliberation, the “actual 
people” speak outside the elected institutions, outside the legislative procedure.184 
Afterwards, during times of “regular politics,” the Court can incorporate into 
constitutional interpretation the voice of the people that was voiced outside the 
legislative procedures during “constitutional moments,” and was not incorporated into 
 
176 Id. at 62. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at 62–63. 
179 Id. at 62; see also id. at 75 (“Congress is not us.”). 
180 Id. at 62. 
181 Id. at 60–61. 
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the Constitution as a formal constitutional amendment.185 By defending the 
achievements of these “constitutional moments,” the Court has the ability to better 
represent the voice of the people than the elected institutions that are engaged in 
regular politics. In this manner, according to Michelman, Ackerman overcomes 
Bickel’s CM difficulty.186 
Michelman adopts Ackerman’s line of thinking and views it as part of a trend of 
getting closer to the people’s voice. Following Ackerman’s idea that changes to the 
Constitution can be made outside the amendment procedure prescribed in Article V, 
Michelman accepts that with enough public support, the legal validity of constitutional 
changes can be acquired without following the formal procedure for its legal 
validation.187  
There is no direct link between Ackerman’s model and the shift in understanding 
judicial legitimacy. However, Ackerman’s idea of constitutional amendment outside 
of Article V allows public support to replace the formal procedures required for 
acquiring legal validity. Ackerman argues that an agenda that acquired sufficient 
legitimacy in terms of public support, without going through the formalized legalized 
procedure of Article V, may have a constitutional meaning akin to a constitutional 
amendment. In putting emphasis of legitimacy in terms of public support rather than 
legality, Ackerman’s insight is analogous to viewing judicial legitimacy in terms of 
public support rather in terms of legal expertise. Legitimacy in the form of public 
support endows authority to the Court, not its adherence to legality in a manner 
analogous to the manner Ackerman endows legitimacy to constitutional amendment 
outside of Article V. It is no surprise then, that in a footnote, Michelman notes:  
[j]udicial construction of the People’s will goes ‘all the way down’ to the 
People’s willing this constructive role upon the judiciary . . . . That self-
government resides finally in the judiciary is not, of course, Ackerman’s 
declared message. His message is that the people are self-governing in 
moments of constitutional politics.188  
As Michelman writes, there is a link between acknowledging the people’s ability 
to endow legitimacy to constitutional changes without going through the procedure of 
constitutional amendment and the Court’s ability to rely on legitimacy stemming from 
the people in confronting the CM difficulty. Understanding judicial legitimacy in 
terms of public support as demonstrated in public opinion polls is just the next step in 
a story-line of making the voice of the people more actual and present.189 In line with 
Michelman’s focus on the perspective of “The People, Where?,” one may view the 
 
185 Id. at 61, 63. 
186 See id. at 63  (“The reviewing Court is the people’s representative in the most 
straightforward sense . . . .”). 
187 See id. at 63–64. 
188 Id. at 65 n.352. 
189 Interestingly, Ackerman’s joint project with James Fishkin that attempts to discover the 
actual voice of the people in elections, relies on a sampling technique derived from public 
opinion polling. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY, 4 (2004). 
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voice of the people as captured in opinion polls as merely another step in a long path 
of harnessing the legitimating power of “the people.”190  
D. After the Shift: The Current Controlling Paradigm 
While it is hard to determine the exact point in time in which a shift in the paradigm 
occurred in the Harvard Forewords, reading Forewords from the last two decades or 
so leaves little doubt that a shift has occurred. During the 1990s—even before the shift 
was apparent—the trend was clear. In her analysis of Casey as part of her 1991 
Foreword,191 Kathleen Sullivan paraphrases The Federalist No. 78 in a manner that 
fits the new paradigm. She writes: “The Court is the least dangerous branch. It cannot 
tax, and it has no tanks. So why should people obey it? Because it has ‘legitimacy, a 
product of substance and perception.’”192 Sullivan does not reference The Federalist 
No. 78 when she creates the clear equivalence between The Federalist’s purse/sword 
and the tax/tanks appearing in her sentence. But while her updated version of the first 
part of The Federalist No. 78 dictum does little in terms of changing Hamilton’s 
insight, she transforms Hamilton’s conclusion. Hamilton wrote that all the judiciary 
has is “judgment,” yet Sullivan speaks of “legitimacy” and adopts the language from 
Casey193 on the public following the Court as a “product of substance and 
perception.”194 In explaining what the judiciary has in the absence of the purse and 
the sword, Sullivan does not speak merely of the Court’s expertise (“substance”), but 
also on the public’s “perception” of the Court.  
Sullivan also clarifies the role of expertise under the new understanding of judicial 
legitimacy. She explains that both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia believe 
that “the only way” to “preserve the Court’s legitimacy,” is “to make the people think” 
the Court “is engaging in law, not politics.”195 Both further believe that it is possible 
to achieve this goal only by ignoring the public “altogether—pay no attention to their 
current opinions or their folkways.”196 In other words, Rehnquist and Scalia share an 
underlying assumption according to which legitimacy is understood in terms of public 
 
190 Cf. PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY, 12 (2011) (“In place of the popular sovereign, the political scientist today speaks 
of popular majorities and of the forces that effect electoral politics – all measurable entities.”). 
Interestingly, Michelman writes that Ackerman did not “seriously confront the difficulties of 
political self-government on a continental scale in modern, mass conditions.” See Michelman, 
supra note 173, at 65 n.352. 
191 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term – Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 71 (1992). 
192 Id. at 71. 
193 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
194 Sullivan, supra note 191, at 71; see also id. at 73, 121 (discussing “public legitimacy”). 
195 Id. at 80. 
196 Id. 
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support.197 They view the way to recruit public support as entailing statements of 
disregard of the people’s views, and presenting the Court as engaged solely in an 
endeavor of legal expertise.198 But the driving force is what the public thinks, and 
demonstrating expertise is merely the means to achieve it.199 
Sullivan’s Foreword focuses on the difference between rules and standards. She 
explains the endorsement of standards by “the liberal Justices” and “the moderate 
Justices” in Casey as an attempt to preserve public support for the Court. According 
to Sullivan, by allowing to “split differences,” standards, rather than rules, ensure 
better responsiveness to the moderates among the American public.200 In the context 
of Casey, Sullivan even refers to an op-ed titled “Justices’ Abortion Ruling Mirrors 
Public Opinion,” and stresses that this “coincidence” was “to be expected.”201 
However, she clarifies that “the moderate Justices” do not conceive themselves as 
“doing politics” by following public opinion polls or election returns.202 
In their 1993 Foreword, William Eskridge and Philip Frickey aim to present “the 
institutional perspective” that goes beyond “the traditional debate” between “legal 
formalism” and “legal realism.”203 The authors discuss the Court’s attempt to 
maintain its legitimacy in Casey (as well as in other cases) and refer to research 
analyzing the correspondence between public opinion polling and the Court’s 
adjudication.204 While they do not identify the Court’s “institutional position” with 
the results of public opinion polls measuring public confidence in the institution and 
in its decisions, the connection between this tool of measurement and assessing the 
Court’s legitimacy is already explicitly made in their Foreword.205  
A further step towards the current controlling paradigm is made by Michael Dorf 
in his 1997 Foreword. Dorf identifies the Court’s institutional legitimacy with the 
 
197 See id. at 102 (“Standing fast under fire undermines – rather than promotes – judicial 
legitimacy, they say.”). 
198 Id. at 101–02. 
199 On Justice Scalia’s approach, see Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 
J.L. & POL. 239, 266–67 (2011) (exposing that Justice Scalia used originalism as an esoteric 
language that allows the Court to preserve its image as a legal expert). 
200 Id. at 100–01. 
201 Id. at 100–01 & n.518 (referring to E.J. Dionne, Jr., Justices’ Abortion Ruling Mirrors 
Public Opinion: Polls Show Americans Would Keep Procedure Legal, But Are as Divided as 
Court on Limits, WASH. POST, July 1, 1992, at A4.). 
202 Id. at 101. Sullivan also refers to opinion polls showing “that more American voters 
identify themselves as ‘moderate’ than either ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’.” See id. at 100. 
203 William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, Foreword 
– Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 95 (1994). 
204 See id. at 38 & n.45. 
205 Id. 
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results of public opinion polling.206 In a section titled “Legitimacy and the Bully 
Pulpit”, he writes that “[t]he legal realist insight that courts make political decisions 
has been with us for over a century without having substantially eroded confidence in 
courts generally, or in the Supreme Court specifically. According to one recent survey, 
the Court enjoys greater public confidence than Congress or government in 
general.”207 
A year later, in his 1998 Foreword, Mark Tushnet paraphrases The Federalist No. 
78 in writing that “[l]acking any direct ability to enforce its judgments, the Court must 
rely on other political actors if it is to act effectively as an institution of 
government.”208 Yet rather than explaining—as Hamilton did—that gaining the 
support of these political actors is based on their belief in the Court’s expertise, 
Tushnet presents a model according to which the support of these actors is driven by 
the position of the Court’s “constituencies.”209 Tushnet ascribes this “constituency 
model”210 to political scientists, thus somewhat distancing his legal point of view from 
theirs.211 Nonetheless, he offers a survey the Court’s various “constituencies” and 
their support for the Court in different periods.212  
While Tushnet does not directly refer to opinion polling when examining the 
Court’s source of legitimacy,213 he uses terms such as “diffuse support” that play a 
central role in understanding the Court’s legitimacy in terms of public support.214 For 
example, he writes:  
[t]he Court can develop constituencies of support by deciding cases in ways 
consistent with the interests of these constituencies. These constituencies, 
who are now generally favorable to the Court, provide a type of diffuse, 
unfocused support. The Court then draws on that diffuse support in deciding 
 
206 See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term, Foreword – The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (1998). 
207 Id. 
208 Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term, Foreword – The New Constitutional 
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 64–65 (1999). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 108 n.372. 
211 See id. at 64. 
212 Id. 
213 Outside the context of judicial legitimacy, Tushnet refers to opinion polling in trying to 
establish a narrative of American national unity connecting the People. He also refers to 
“communications about public opinion” while discussing the manner in which political 
scientists view the Court’s decision-making as influenced by sources external to the law. Id. at 
108 n.372. 
214 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992); see also Tushnet, supra note 208, at 65 n.165. 
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controversial cases that are not directly responsive to any particular 
constituency’s interests.215  
Tushnet is already speaking in the language of the new paradigm, but three years 
later in Aharon Barak’s 2001 Foreword, the discussion becomes much more explicit. 
Barak dedicates a full section to “public confidence” in the judiciary as part of a 
discussion of the “preconditions” required to realize “the proper judicial role.”216 He 
begins this section by stating that “another essential condition for realizing the judicial 
role is public confidence in the judge.”217 He adds, “the judge has neither sword nor 
purse.” However, in the footnote to this sentence he references not to Hamilton’s 
dictum from The Federalist No. 78, but to Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion from Baker 
v. Carr.218 In his dissent, Frankfurter paraphrased Hamilton saying that “[t]he Court’s 
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained 
public confidence in its moral sanction.”219 Frankfurter’s quote—and not 
Hamilton’s—is brought by Barak as if it is the original source for the insight that the 
judiciary “has neither sword nor purse.” Hamilton’s insight on expertise as the Court’s 
source of legitimacy is replaced by Frankfurter’s paraphrased version that puts “public 
confidence” as the Court’s source of legitimacy. Barak’s use of Frankfurter’s dissent 
without referencing to the original version by Hamilton demonstrates the dominance 
the new paradigm has acquired. The best proof for dominance of a new paradigm is 
its ability to re-write the past in a manner that incorporates it under a revised 
terminology. 
Based on his adoption of Frankfurter’s paraphrase of The Federalist No. 78, Barak 
concludes that “[a]ll [the judge] has is the public’s confidence in him. This fact means 
that the public recognizes the legitimacy of judicial decisions, even if it disagrees with 
their content.”220 As expressed here, Barak’s notion of public confidence is close to 
what, in political science jargon, is known as diffuse support. Barak views public 
confidence in the judiciary as vital for resisting changes to courts’ composition and 
jurisdiction in case of a clash with the other branches of government.221 Barak writes 
that “public confidence does not mean the need to ensure popularity. Public 
confidence does not mean following popular trends or public opinion polls.”222 And 
 
215 Id. at 65 n.165. 
216 See id. at 53, 59–62. It should be noted however that Barak defines and discusses the CM 
difficulty in its traditional sense as a problem of non-accountability. He stresses that “I contend 
that the most important asset a judge has in fulfilling his or her role is the lack of direct 
accountability to the public.” Id. at 52. 
217 Id. at 52. 
218 Id. at 59 n.172. 
219 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962). 
220 Id. at 59–60. 
221 See id. at 117. 
222 Id. at 60; see also id. at 161 (“Judges are not the representatives of the people, and it 
would be a tragedy if they became so.”). 
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yet, when discussing Brown v. Board of Education,223 Barak emphasizes the inability 
of a court to “retain public confidence if it announces a new Brown twice every 
week.”224  
In his 2002 Foreword, Robert Post identifies two paradigms for understanding the 
Court’s source of authority. One based on the “autonomy of constitutional law” (or in 
my terms: expertise) and the other based on trust (or in my terms: public 
confidence).225 According to Post, the Court’s “legal authority” cannot depend merely 
on its expertise, but must instead be conceived as “the result of a certain relationship 
of trust that the Court works to establish with the American public.”226 Post concludes 
his Foreword by noting:  
[T]he Court must begin to reconceive judicial authority as the consequence 
of a relationship of trust that it continuously strives to establish with the 
nation. It must come to believe that the institution of judicial review will 
remain legitimate to the extent that the Court retains the warranted 
confidence of the country, conferred in recognition of a judiciary that is 
deeply loyal to ‘the compelling traditions of the legal profession’ 
apprehended with due regard for the constitutional convictions of the 
American people.227 
Post not only presents a conceptual distinction between the Court’s two sources of 
authority, but also alludes to public opinion as the Court’s source of authority.228 True, 
Post does not identify the rise of public opinion polling as responsible for a shift in 
understanding judicial legitimacy. Moreover, at times he seems to believe that 
expertise is still a viable source of legitimacy for the Court.229 He notes that the Court 
will continue to be divided on the issue of which understanding of legitimacy is 
viable.230 Yet, on other occasions, Post argues that understanding the Court’s 
legitimacy in terms of expertise—an understanding Post attributes to Justice Scalia—
has failed or is at least doomed to fail.231  
 
223 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
224 Barak, supra note 18, at 88; see also id. at 104–06. 
225 See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (2003). 
226 Id. at 109. 
227 Id. at 111–12. 
228 See id. at 107–09. 
229 See id. at 9–11, 110–11. 
230 See id. at 10–11. 
231 See id. at 31–32, 110–11 (“Even if the jurisprudential claim of autonomy is theoretically 
unsustainable, therefore, Scalia’s position remains nettlesome precisely because this conception 
of the law-politics distinction is deeply ingrained and pervasively regarded as a necessary 
foundation for the maintenance of judicial independence . . . . The authority of that law does 
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As I explain elsewhere, Scalia, and current Justices who speak in the name of 
expertise, adhere to understanding judicial legitimacy in terms of public support. They 
view expertise as a tool to achieve public confidence.232 Their position should not be 
confused with working under the understanding of judicial legitimacy in terms of 
expertise.233 For Hamilton, expertise is the source of judicial legitimacy, not a means 
by which public support is to be obtained.  
The understanding of democracy in quantitative terms is at the center of Fredrick 
Schauer’s 2005 Foreword.234 He explains:  
the worry in the United States — and the motivation behind the call for 
popular constitutionalism or for limiting judicial review — seems also to be 
primarily about a democratic deficit in the aggregate rather than the 
theoretical problem arising from isolated and relatively inconsequential 
individual exercises of nondemocratic power, or even from episodic but 
consequential judicial countermajoritarian interventions. It is thus this 
quantitative sense of democracy that appears to be at stake in many of the 
debates, and it is this quantitative claim that there is a democratic deficit that 
is my primary target here.235  
Even though the switch to the literal version of the CM difficulty can serve as 
further evidence to support the trend Schauer detects of adopting a “quantitative sense 
of democracy,” he does not identify the switch in understanding the CM difficulty and 
the rise of the CM difficulty in its literal version. He conflates the two versions of the 
CM difficulty. At some points in the Foreword, he relies on the traditional version of 
the CM difficulty and in other parts on the literal one.236  
 
not, and cannot, depend upon the exercise of purely professional logic, but rather upon public 
support for the Court that fashions it.”). 
232 See Or Bassok, The Court Cannot Hold, 30 J.L. & POL. 1, 37–41 (2014). 
233 At times Post seems to agree with such an assessment. Post, supra note 225, at 50 (“The 
impassioned rhetoric of Lawrence suggests that the Court well understands that the opinion's 
legal authority is connected to the Court’s success in influencing public opinion. Despite his 
embrace of the autonomy of constitutional law, Scalia also plainly understands this dynamic, 
for he uses his dissent to denigrate Lawrence . . . and to mobilize political resistance to Lawrence 
. . . .”). 
234 See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term – Foreword: The Court’s Agenda 
— and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 52–53 (2006). 
235 Id. at 53. 
236 At the beginning of the Foreword Schauer explains that “[p]olicymaking in a democracy, 
so the argument goes, should be left to officials more responsive to popular will than judges, 
who because of their comparative nonaccountability to the public should keep their 
policymaking to a minimum. Government by judiciary, it is said, is the antithesis of 
democracy.” Id. at 5–6. In an accompanying footnote he notes that “‘Government by judiciary’ 
is of course a tendentious phrasing of what we now call the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty.’” 
Id. at 6 n.2. While in these sentences both versions of the CM difficulty are present, later in the 
article Schauer switches to an understanding of the CM difficulty in its literal sense. He writes:  
at times the Supreme Court’s decisions help to make the issues with which it deals 
more salient, its post-New Deal history suggests a positive correlation between low 
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The gist of Schauer’s Foreword is that the Court does not decide on the most salient 
issues that occupy public discourse, and thus, “the people and their elected 
representatives can nevertheless be understood as still making the vast bulk of 
decisions that are most important to the people themselves.”237 He therefore concludes 
that “the central decisions” in the United States are made “in a comparatively more 
popularly responsive way.”238 Based on this conclusion he “calls into question much 
of the contemporary and not-so-contemporary angst about the countermajoritarian or 
anti-democratic behaviour of the Court.”239 For the purposes of this Article, the 
important point is that Schauer detects that the Court’s legitimacy problem, as it is 
currently understood, is focused on the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion. 
Furthermore, he emphasizes that this problem is understood not in “theoretical” but in 
“quantitative” terms.240 While he does not detect the switch to the literal CM difficulty 
as another manifestation of his thesis, his discussion is based on understanding the 
Court’s legitimacy in terms of measurable public support rather than in normative 
theoretical terms.241  
A year before Schauer, Richard Posner, in his 2004 Foreword, also offered a 
distinction demonstrating his adherence to understanding judicial legitimacy in terms 
of public support.242 Posner distinguishes between constitutional cases—that Schauer 
would probably define as salient cases—and non-constitutional cases.243 In 
constitutional cases, according to Posner, the Court’s “gallery . . . is the court of public 
 
salience and judicial counter-majoritarian aggressiveness . . . Indeed, even in its most 
important and most famous Watergate case, United States v. Nixon, the Court climbed 
on the train of anti-Nixon public opinion well after it had left the station.  
Id. at 59–60. In a similar fashion Richard Fallon also refers to both definitions in his 1996 
Foreword, though his discussion of the Court’s legitimacy is very thin. See Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term – Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 54, 143 (1997) (“Recognizing that reasonable people differ, we can still vest responsibility 
for relatively nondeferential constitutional decisionmaking in a nonmajoritarian institution, with 
rational hope of getting better determinations of constitutional principle and more successful 
constitutional implementation than we would get from the not necessarily unreasonable 
judgments of other, more politically accountable institutions.”). 
237 Schauer, supra note 234, at 53. 
238 Id. 
239 Id.; see also id. at 55. 
240 Id. at 52–53. 
241 Interestingly, at one point, Schauer discusses the argument that the Court makes “final 
decisions” about many central issues in total “disregard either [to] the views of the people at 
large or the views of the people’s elected representatives.” In a footnote accompanying the 
sentence quoted, he contrasts (“But see”) between the text and Atkins v. Virginia, noting that 
this case was decided by “drawing on polls to prohibit capital punishment for the mentally 
retarded.” Id. at 53 & n.186. 
242 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term – Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32 (2005). 
243 Id. at 79–81. 
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opinion, and its participation in constitutional controversies injects a democratic 
element into constitutional adjudication.”244  
Adrian Vermeule’s 2009 Foreword identifies a “fallacy of division” in the 
assumption that “if the overall constitutional order is to be democratic, the Supreme 
Court must itself be democratic.”245 Using sophisticated terminology, Vermeule 
uncovers an insight Fiss already identified in his 1978 Foreword. As noted above, Fiss 
observed that democracy as a system of government requires the consent of the people 
to the system as a whole and not to each of its institutions. 246 Vermeule identifies a 
similar “fallacy of division” in his discussion of the CM difficulty. He attempts to 
salvage the now almost forgotten understanding that a democratic regime does not 
require all of its organs to be majoritarian.247 For Fiss, the realization that the 
legitimacy of the judiciary is not determined by majority support did not require 
exposing a fallacy and an excavation effort as this understanding was still part of a 
fading paradigm of a recent era. Vermeule’s Foreword is written in an era controlled 
by the majoritarian paradigm, and in order to see beyond this paradigm, refuting a 
fallacy is required. 
The dominance of this paradigm is also apparent from Vermeule’s characterization 
of the CM difficulty. Vermeule’s aim to counter the problem that “arises from the 
claim that the Supreme Court’s power to overturn statutes on constitutional grounds 
is inconsistent with the constitutional order’s deep commitment to majoritarian 
democracy.”248 As is apparent from this quote, Vermeule writes according to the 
understanding that the CM difficulty is about majoritarianism rather than about 
accountability.249 Understanding the CM difficulty in this literal sense is in line with 
understanding judicial legitimacy in terms of public support.  
Two years earlier, Lani Guinier puts at the center of her 2007 Foreword the 
argument that judges who offer oral dissenting opinions “may spark a deliberative 
process that enhances public confidence in the legitimacy of the judicial process.”250 
Guinier’s entire thesis in her Foreword is built on understanding judicial legitimacy in 
 
244 Id. at 81. 
245 Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term – Foreword: System Effects and the 
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 37 (2009); see also id. at 6, 9. 
246 See Fiss, supra note 4, at 38. 
247 See id. at 38 (“It is an analytic mistake, rather than an empirical one, to argue from the 
premise that the overall constitutional order should be democratic to the conclusion that an 
undemocratic Supreme Court must be undesirable.”). 
248 Id. at 37. 
249 It should be noted that Vermeule writes that the CM difficulty “originated with Alexander 
Bickel, but it has a long history and periodically reappears, in changing and ever more 
sophisticated forms.” See Vermeule, supra note 245, at 53. 
250 Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term – Foreword: Demosprudence Through 
Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2008); see also id. at 50 (“[t]he Court’s legitimacy – its ability 
to engender confidence in its judgments . . . .”). Id. at 54 (noting that oral dissents “help reframe 
our understanding of the important role that mobilized or engaged constituencies play in 
legitimating the Court’s constitutional role.”). 
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
36 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [70:1 
terms of public support for the Court.251 For this reason, she writes that democracy-
enhancing “dissenters need to be clear that their potential audience are external, not 
internal.”252 According to this argument, evaluating at least some dissenting judicial 
opinions is conducted not according to a “measurement” of legal expertise, of 
convincing fellow-lawyers, but according to measurement of public opinion.253 
In Dan Kahan’s 2010 Foreword, the public confidence paradigm is so 
uncontroversial that it is assumed as an uncontested premise.254 Kahan’s thesis is that 
“[t]he United States Supreme Court is an institution in crisis” because the public is 
losing its confidence in the reality of the Court’s neutrality.255 In his Foreword, he 
aims to show that this crisis in confidence is based on the way “culturally diverse 
groups form impressions on what the Court’s decisions mean,” rather than on the 
Court’s actual positions.256 The focus is not on critiquing the Court’s adjudication in 
terms of legal expertise, but whether the Court is losing public confidence.  
Many of the 1960s and 1970s Forewords were solely interested in improving the 
Court’s doctrinal craft as an independent goal. Any doctrinal discussion in Guinier’s 
and Kahan’s Foreword is instrumental to the goal of improving the Court’s ability to 
harness public support.257 In a reality in which public support for the Court is at the 
center of discussion, the way in which the Court’s adjudication is conveyed to the 
public has a vital importance as well as the biases that influence public perception of 
the Court. Thus, it is not surprising that media coverage of the Court’s judgments and 
the opportunities to communicate judicial opinions to the public through the internet 
are so central to Guinier’s Foreword.258 Equally unsurprising is the focus of public 
perception in Kahan’s Foreword.  
 
251 See id. at 56 (“The Court can of course be responsive to the will of the people expressed 
through the legislature, but that is not the only way the Court is democratically accountable.”); 
see also id. at 115, 126–27. 
252 Id. at 113. 
253 See id. at 16 (“Demosprudence, unlike traditional jurisprudence, is not concerned 
primarily with the logical reasoning or legal principles that animate and justify a judicial 
opinion.”). 
254 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term – Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
255 Id. at 4–6. 
256 Id. at 6. 
257 For example, in discussing Justice Stevens’ oral dissents in Heller, Guinier comments 
that “[a]lthough his use of eight points exceeds the classic three-point protocol for maintaining 
an audience’s attention, Justice Stevens keeps those points concise and comprehensible for 
listeners. He uses simple language that refers to case precedents plain to the average high-
school-educated listener.” See Guinier, supra note 250, at 73–74, 94. 
258 Id. at 10, 24, 29–31, 34, 37, 41, 53–54, 67–69, 76, 82–83, 101, 120. 
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As opposed to most American legal scholars and social scientists of the current 
era,259 Karlan’s 2011 Foreword does not read Hamilton through the current 
controlling paradigm and paraphrases his dictum to fit the paradigm. She detects that 
Hamilton did not subscribe to the current controlling understanding of the Court’s 
legitimacy.260 She argues that Hamilton was “slightly off base.”261 Yet, as explained 
above, Hamilton was not off at all. He had a different understanding of judicial 
legitimacy, one in which the Court does not need to rely on public confidence to 
function properly.  
In line with the new paradigm, Karlan quotes Frankfurter’s paraphrase of 
Hamilton’s insight as the correct view of the Court’s source of legitimacy.262 Yet she 
argues that Frankfurter’s concern that the Warren Court eroded its public support 
proved “to be unfounded.”263 In fact, Karlan explains that the Roberts Court enjoys 
public support thanks to the Warren Court “having been on the right side of history in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”264 Yet, she quotes recent public opinion polls that, in 
her view, demonstrate that the Court is risking its public standing because the public 
perceives it more and more as a politically motivated.265 
In his 2015 Foreword, Daryl Levinson contrasts the “endless hand wringing over 
the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review” and the position according to which 
the “Court appears not supreme over the political branches and popular majorities but 
subservient to them.”266 He then writes that “[g]enerations of political scientists have 
followed Dahl in observing ‘the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long 
out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the 
United States.’”267 In the footnote accompanying this text he refers to Barry 
 
259 See, e.g., Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 52, at 507 (equating judicial legitimacy and 
“acceptance of the Court as a constitutional branch, measured by public opinion polls”); James 
W. Stoutenborough & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court: 
A New Look at the Impact of Court Decisions, 45 SOC. SCI. J. 28, 29 (2008) (referring to the 
Federalist No. 78 and to Frankfurter’s quote from Baker v. Carr and noting that “[l]egitimacy 
is tied, to a great extent, to the public’s confidence, or specific support, in the Court as an 
institution . . . and without a reservoir of goodwill the Court will struggle to maintain its 
legitimacy.”). 
260 See Karlan, supra note 3, at 71. 
261 See id. 
262 Id. at 8. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 70. 
265 Id. at 7 & n.34. 
266 Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term – Foreword: Looking for Power in 
Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 60 (2016). 
267 Id. 
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Friedman’s work that documented “the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion.”268 
There is a tension between the text that speaks on the Court’s responsiveness to 
“lawmaking majorities” and the footnote that refers to its responsiveness to public 
opinion. This tension is best explained by examining the manner in which Robert 
Dahl’s work is currently used, including by Levinson. 
Many scholars have expressed their puzzlement that Bickel formulated the CM 
difficulty in 1962, while only five years earlier, Robert Dahl, a Yale political 
scientist—who sat only a few blocks away from Bickel’s office at Yale Law School—
already disproved the difficulty.269 This depiction of intellectual history is misguided 
for two reasons.270 First, as outlined above, Bickel defined the difficulty in terms of 
accountability making the problem inherently insolvable (unless Supreme Court 
justices are elected).271 Second, Dahl did not rely on measurements of public support 
for the Court and its judgments.272 Hence, he did not resolve the CM difficulty in its 
modern literal formulation that focuses on the difficulty of the Court countering the 
views of the public as measured in public opinion polls. Dahl’s article discussed the 
responsiveness of the Court to the “dominant national alliance” by using the position 
of the legislative majority in Congress up to four years before the Court’s decision as 
an “indirect” indication for majority will.273 This is the origin for Levinson’s reference 
to “lawmaking majorities.”274 Dahl used this methodology because “scientific opinion 
polls [were] of relatively recent origin” and not enough direct data of public views 
were available at the time he wrote his article.275 He explained that “lawmaking 
majorities” are considered on “somewhat uncertain grounds…as equivalent to a 
national majority.”276 Dahl suggested that the Court counters “lawmaking majorities” 
only during “short-lived transitional periods,” when the dominant political coalition is 
disintegrating or otherwise unstable.277 Most of the time, the appointment of Justices 
 
268 Id. at 60 n.165; see also id. at 73 (“the Justices do not want to place the Court’s public 
esteem and political independence at risk by taking unpopular positions on issues that the public 
and the political branches care most about.”). 
269 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a ‘Majoritarian’ Institution?, 2010 
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104 (2010); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 220–21 (2002). 
270 See Bassok, Countermajorian Difficulties, supra note 29, at 333–62. 
271 See supra Part VI.C.1. 
272 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283–84 (1957). 
273 See id. at 284, 293. 
274 Levinson, supra note 266, at 60. 
275 Dahl, supra note 272, at 283–84. 
276 Id. at 284. 
277 See id. at 293. 
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by Presidents who are part of dominant political coalition ensures that the Court’s 
decisions are in line with the will of lawmaking coalitions.278  
Dahl may have already foreseen the future in terms of conceiving judicial 
legitimacy in measurable terms of public support. Yet, he lacked the opinion polling 
data to complete the shift in understanding judicial legitimacy. As he explained: “for 
the greater part of the Court’s history . . . there is simply no way to establish with any 
high degree of confidence whether a given alternative was or was not supported by a 
majority of adults or even of voters.”279  
Levinson follows Dahl’s footsteps in viewing “lawmaking coalitions” as a 
surrogate for “popular majorities.”280 Yet, in presenting the CM difficulty as 
potentially resolved by empirical research conducted by political scientists measuring 
public support for the Court’s decisions,281 Levinson adheres to the current literal 
understanding of the CM difficulty that is a product of understanding judicial 
legitimacy in terms of public support. Thinking that the CM difficulty can be resolved 
by showing that the Court’s decisions are in sync with the results of public opinion 
polls was foreign to Bickel who saw the difficulty as inherent to an unaccountable 
judiciary. Responsiveness does not equate to accountability.  
 Jamal Greene’s 2017 Foreword promotes adopting proportionality review in 
American adjudication as the technique for deciding constitutional controversies over 
rights.282 In discussing “the costs of proportionality,” Greene explores the impact that 
using proportionality review would have on the judiciary’s legitimacy.283 He notes 
that since proportionality “mimic[s] the decisional process of legislatures, [it] risks 
decreasing the legitimacy of courts . . . . The opiate of the masses is not religion on 
 
278 See Adamany & Meinhold, supra note 93, at 362–63, 374; Pildes, supra note 269, at 104 
(Dahl “concluded that the Supreme Court had not functioned historically as a 
countermajoritarian institution and, for structural reasons, was unlikely to do so.”); Levinson, 
supra note 266, at 60–61. 
279 Dahl, supra note 272, at 284. 
280 See Levinson, supra note 266, at 36; see also id. at 88–89, 90 n.323. 
281 The depiction of political scientists whose work is focused on the Court has changed over 
the years in the Harvard Forewords. In the opening lines to his 1952 Foreword, Mark DeWolfe 
Howe writes:  
[t]he stream of constitutional law to which the editors of the Harvard Law Review 
each year devote their attention runs a course in which not only the practitioner is 
professionally interested but with which the political scientist is also concerned. The 
one is interested in the direction which law has followed; the other is concerned with 
the course which political theory has taken.  
Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term – Foreword: Political Theory and the 
Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1953). 
282 See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term – Foreword: Rights as Trumps, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018). 
283 Id. at 85–90. 
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this view, but law.”284 A few pages later, to support his claims on the “institutional 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court,” Greene brings results of public opinion polls that 
were conducted by James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira and measure support for the 
Court.285 This identification of judicial legitimacy with results of public opinion polls 
is vivid in Greene’s conclusion of this point, which states, “[m]ore generally, studies 
of diffuse public support for the constitutional or apex courts of jurisdictions that 
practice proportionality as a matter of course, such as Canada and Germany, do not 
report substantial differences from support for the U.S. Supreme Court among the 
American public.”286 For Greene, the idea that judicial legitimacy means public 
support for the judiciary, as measured in opinion polls, is an inherent truth of 
constitutional theory. For this reason, it applies not only to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
but also to other national high courts worldwide.287  
E. The Challenger 
Among the Harvard Forewords, Larry Kramer’s 2000 Foreword presents the most 
serious challenge to my thesis on the shift in understanding judicial legitimacy. 
According to Kramer, in recent decades among both conservative and progressive 
justices, there is an acceptance of the understanding that “the Constitution is nothing 
more than a species of ordinary law, hence something whose content and meaning are 
properly resolved by judges.”288 The rise of this understanding occurs while the 
competing understanding of viewing the Constitution as “a special kind of 
fundamental law outside the regular legal system” is in decline.289 In other words, 
Kramer presents the acceptance of judicial supremacy in recent decades as a result of 
a rise in viewing the Court’s legitimacy in terms of legal expertise.  
Kramer’s Foreword undermines my argument. He describes the current controlling 
understanding of judicial legitimacy in terms of expertise and argues that this 
understanding is on the rise rather than in decline, as I argue. This Article treats the 
Forewords mostly as pieces of data that prove or disprove my argument that the change 
in understanding judicial legitimacy is reflected in the Harvard Forewords. As a piece 
of data, Kramer’s Foreword shows that not all authors of the Harvard Forewords in 
recent decades express in their arguments an understanding judicial legitimacy in 
terms of public support. In other words, in this Article, I examine whether my thesis 
on the shift in understanding of judicial legitimacy is manifested in the Forewords’ 
arguments. Kramer’s Foreword not merely fails to support this thesis, its existence 
 
284 Id. at 89; see also id. at 91 (“Judges must persuade citizens that courts are needed and 
worth listening to.”). 
285 Id. at 92. 
286 Id. 
287 For difficulties with transplanting the American paradigm with regard to the legitimacy 
of constitutional courts in South Africa and Germany see generally Or Bassok, South African 
Constitutional Doctors with Low Public Support, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 521 (2015); Bassok, 
Schmitelsen Court, supra note 122, at 158. 
288 Kramer, supra note 9, at 160; see also id. at 85, 95–96, 99, 104, 130, 153, 164. 
289 Id. at 163–64. 
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goes against it. My only counterargument against Kramer’s Foreword, as a piece of 
data, is to point out that it is merely an outlier to the paradigm that has been manifested 
in the Harvard Forewords since the 1990s. 
While I cannot negate Kramer’s Foreword as a piece of data that undermines my 
argument, I do criticize the substance of his argument in the lines below. In other 
words, the discussion below is not focused on whether the Harvard Forewords as a 
sample of constitutional scholarship demonstrate the correctness of my argument on 
the shift in understanding judicial legitimacy. Rather, I aim to confront Kramer’s claim 
that there is a rise, rather than a decline, in understanding judicial legitimacy in terms 
of expertise.  
In terms of describing American constitutional history, there are several points of 
correspondence between my account and Kramer’s. In both accounts, there is no story 
of a linear decline or a constant rise in the belief in judicial expertise. Kramer’s account 
emphasizes that during the early republic the judiciary’s legitimacy stemmed from 
viewing judges as “the people’s agents.”290 He explains that “[i]f judicial review was 
permitted, it was . . . as a ‘political-legal’ act, a substitute for popular resistance, 
required by the people’s command to ignore laws that were ultra vires . . . .”291 This 
account stands in contrast to the strong reliance on legal expertise during the early 
days of the republic.292 Kramer cannot—and indeed does not—deny that during the 
same years, many prominent figures, such as Hamilton, understood judicial legitimacy 
in terms of expertise.293 
Both Kramer’s account and mine agree that the rise of the position known as 
judicial supremacy occurred in recent decades.294 As Kramer points out, according to 
this position, “judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional interpretation 
and that their decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone.”295 
But there is an important point of divergence between Kramer’s account and mine 
when it comes to explaining the rise of judicial supremacy. My explanation is that the 
rise of judicial supremacy occurred following the invention of public opinion polls 
that allowed measurements of public support for the Court. These measurements 
enabled the rise of a novel understanding of judicial legitimacy. This new 
understanding of judicial legitimacy opened the door for acceptance of judicial 
supremacy by the elected branches not based on belief in judicial expertise, but due to 
 
290 See id. at 53; see also id. at 54–56, 82. 
291 Id. at 74. 
292 Compare id. at 74 (“If judicial enforcement was implicit in the Constitution, it was not 
because the Constitution was the kind of law that courts were normally responsible for 
overseeing or because it was a kind of law that judges were uniquely qualified to interpret and 
enforce . . . .”), with ACKERMAN, supra note 128, at 33 (“The only expertise the Founders 
recognized was of the legal variety . . . .”). 
293 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 68, 94. 
294 See id. at 6–7 (“It seems fair to say that, as a descriptive matter, judges, lawyers, 
politicians, and the general public today accept the principle of judicial supremacy—indeed, 
they assume it as a matter of course.”). 
295 Id. at 6. 
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the Court’s public support as expressed in public opinion polls. Kramer detects that 
there is strong public support for judicial supremacy (though he does not refer to 
opinion polls to establish it).296 However, he views the rise of judicial supremacy as 
emanating from a shared understanding of constitutional law in terms of “ordinary 
law.”297  
Kramer’s depiction of the connection between the rise of judicial supremacy and 
understanding constitutional law as “ordinary law” is in tension with the growing 
understanding of the political nature of constitutional law.298 According to Kramer, 
the rise of judicial supremacy is connected to a growing belief in law as an autonomous 
realm.299 But how does this assessment fit the clear decline in viewing constitutional 
law as an apolitical field of expertise? This decline explains—according to my 
argument—the Court’s need to seek a new source of legitimacy.  
Even if we follow Kramer’s line of thinking, the decline in belief in judicial 
expertise should have pushed towards disbelief in constitutional law as ordinary law. 
According to Kramer, during periods in American history in which constitutional law 
was not viewed as a field of expertise, the “political-legal language” was used by the 
people for discussing and interpreting the Constitution.300 Subsequently, the 
“political-legal language” should have been on the rise as it better fits a period in 
which the divide between law and politics is eroding. Such developments should have 
been accompanied by a rise of “the people themselves,” rather than judges, as the chief 
interpreters the Constitution. Yet, Kramer argues that the opposite has happened as 
the Court has become the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.  
Kramer understands that the way the voice of the people is conceptualized changes 
over time. One of his chief insights touches on this point. “Bear in mind,” he writes, 
“that the practice of popular constitutionalism had changed, because the means of 
expressing popular will were understood differently in 1840 than they had been in 
1790.”301 Kramer refers here to the rise of party politics that absorbed the voice of the 
people into a party-based political system. He adds that “[b]y 1840, then, popular 
constitutionalism meant popular will expressed by and through elected 
 
296 See id. at 6–7 (“It seems fair to say that, as a descriptive matter, judges, lawyers, 
politicians, and the general public today accept the principle of judicial supremacy—indeed, 
they assume it as a matter of course.”); id. at 123. 
297 See id. at 8–9 (“Put simply, everyone—friend or foe of supremacy—begins with a shared 
understanding of the Constitution as ordinary law.”); id. at 129–30. 
 298 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7, 11 (2011) 
(“[M]any people no longer see judges as possessing legal expertise); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, 
COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 2 (2016) 
(“The public has long internalized what scholars have confirmed: When judges decide difficult 
cases, they are subject to the influence of ideology, strategic consideration, race, gender, 
religion, emotion, their life experience, and other extralegal factors despite their assertions to 
the contrary.”). 
299 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 8. 
300 See id. at 26, 79, 87. 
301 Id. at 112. 
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representatives.”302 However, while Kramer detects the effect of this change in “the 
means of expressing popular will,” he fails to detect a similar change following the 
invention of opinion polling. Kramer does not detect that the publication of public 
opinion polls in news media has demonstrated public support for the Court publicly 
and regularly, thus having a detrimental effect on understanding judicial 
legitimacy.303 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Forewords from recent decades, understanding judicial legitimacy in terms of 
public support appears as an objective truth that describes “the world unclouded by 
preconceptions.”304 However, by tracking the genealogy of this understanding in the 
Harvard Forewords, I demonstrated that its meaning changed in recent decades, and 
thus exposed its contingent nature. Judicial legitimacy is a man and woman-made 
construct. Different generations have attributed different meaning to this construct. 
The shift detected in the Forewords reflects a change in the understanding of the 
judicial legitimacy construct. Today, there is almost a consensus among American 
scholars and Supreme Court justices that because the Court lacks direct control over 
either the “sword or the purse,” enduring public support (or sociological legitimacy in 
professional jargon) is necessary for the Court’s proper function.305  
This change can be presented as a debate on how to measure the performance of 
the Supreme Court. Should the Court be assessed merely in terms of legality by its 
professional community, or should it be assessed by the general public that evaluates 
the Court’s performance according to standards that do not necessarily correspond to 
legal expertise? In his 1970 Foreword, Harry Kalven offered a similar insight in a 
context not so far from the one discussed in this Article. He wrote that “[t]he special 
burden of the Court, then, is to exercise great political powers while still acting like a 
court . . . . For institutions with such mixed function there can be no simple blueprint 
against which to measure performance.”306  
Scholars who argue that the Court has followed public opinion throughout its 
history fail to detect the great shift caused by the introduction of a metric—public 
opinion polling—that has allowed for the first time in history the assessment of the 
 
302 Id. at 112–13. 
303 See id. at 129 (“Identifying the origins of this drift toward judicial exclusivity is not 
easy.”). Barry Friedman’s book The Will of the People suffers from the same flaw. See my 
critique in Bassok, Schmitelsen Court, supra note 122, at 161–62. 
304 Minow, supra note 79, at 46 (discussing W.V. Quine’s ideas and noting that “we cannot 
see the world unclouded by preconceptions.”). 
305 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(“The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that 
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary . . . .”); Friedman, supra note 269, at 
221 (“[M]any commentators made the point that judicial power ultimately depended upon 
popular acceptance.”). 
306 Harry Kalven Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term – Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at 
War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (1971). 
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Court’s work according to public support.307 The ability to track public support for 
the Court, the public record of this support (often published by popular media), and 
the scientific allure of opinion polls made public confidence in the Court more “real” 
in the public imagination.308 Before the introduction of public opinion polls, the Court 
may have followed public opinion, in the sense of following the cues it received from 
Congress or following impressionistic assessments of what public opinion is.309 
However, the Court never had a distinct, independent, and public metric that 
demonstrated to the other branches that it enjoys public support. The entrance of public 
opinion polls as a reliable metric—measuring the confidence of the public in the Court 
and demonstrating it publicly—made it an independent criterion of legitimacy.310 This 
metric—followed as a matter of regular course of business by the elected branches—
created an alternative to legal expertise in terms of assessing the legitimacy of the 
Court’s adjudication.  
However, the end result is not two metrics that are equally available to evaluate 
the Court’s work. As this Article shows, the expertise metric has been distorted and 
incorporated into the public support metric. One example of this development is 
Kahan’s and Guinier’s forewords where legal expertise is understood as mere means 
for maintaining public support for the Court.311 
 In her 1986 Foreword, Minow emphasizes the importance in detecting which 
pictures of reality are excluded “from discussion or even imagination.”312 A picture 
of reality becomes most powerful when it is viewed as the “truth,” and the competing 
visions “disappear behind the vision that prevails.”313 A good example to such a 
process in the Harvard Forewords is the paraphrasing of Hamilton’s dictum from The 
Federalist No. 78. Originally Hamilton spoke of expertise as the source of judicial 
legitimacy, but his dictum is now read as saying that the Court’s legitimacy is based 
on public confidence. The “re-writing” of The Federalist No. 78 and the disappearance 
of understanding judicial legitimacy in terms of expertise should come as no surprise 
once we understand how paradigms work. Phenomena that transgress or contradict a 
controlling paradigm are either ignored, relegated as a temporary aberration or re-
narrated so that they will fit the controlling paradigm.314 
Every discipline works under certain paradigms. A discipline cannot confront, 
every day anew, the vast amount of knowledge without some organizing 
 
307 See Bassok, Source of Legitamacy, supra note 24, at 192–93. 
308 See Fried & Harris, supra note 117, at 323. 
309 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 58; TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 194 (2011). 
310 See BOGART, supra note 117, at xxx. 
311 See Kahan, supra note 254, at 4; Guinier, supra note 250, at 56. 
312 Minow, supra note 79, at 68. 
313 Id. at 67 (“Ideological success is achieved when only dissenting views are regarded as 
ideologies; the prevailing view is the truth.”). 
314 See KUHN, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
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paradigms.315 By researching the genealogy of paradigms we can expose their 
contingent nature, and thus see how they present constrains our thinking.316 These 
paradigms influence not only what arguments are considered valid, but also what 
arguments are made or even conceived.317 Exposing the paradigms that control 
American constitutional thought is the first step in understanding their influence on 
the Court’s adjudication and on constitutional thought. Only afterwards, we may be 










315 See id. 
316 See Skinner, supra note 6, at 53. 
317 See Quentin Skinner, Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 2 
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